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Introduction 
 
Why is corporate governance relevant? What is corporate governance for? There are 
numerous interesting questions regarding corporate governance and its relevance in the 
academic and corporate world. As widely known, managers’ interests and objectives differ 
from those of the shareholders. The formers aim at maximizing their remuneration and 
personal wealth. They often engage in selfish behaviors, using shareholders’ money in 
beyond-the-core activities in order to build an empire of large, diversified, and global 
business, which often underperform more focused companies (Lev, 2012). 
In this regard, corporate governance aims at minimizing these conflicts of interests 
(i.e. agency costs), even though whether or not it mitigates such agency conflicts is still an 
unanswered question.  Specifically, corporate governance is made by a large number of 
mechanisms, some of which are a result of competitive forces and market conditions (i.e. the 
market for corporate control, executive compensation, etc.), while others (the majority) are 
legally imposed (see, e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., and the Codice Preda in Italy). 
Such mechanisms should monitor managers and punish opportunistic behaviors, thereby 
aligning their interests with those of the owners. 
Most of the academic research on corporate governance has been largely focused on 
widely held public corporations. In this class of firms the ownership is dispersed amongst a 
multitude of investors. As a consequence, agency conflicts arise between managers and 
shareholders given the separation between ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This ownership structure is typical in countries with high legal investor protection 
(Zingales, 1994; Volpin, 2002), such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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Despite much of the research focusing on widely held public firms, in fact, family 
firms represent the dominant ownership form in the corporate world (Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
Even though it may sound unconventional, in the Unites States (which is broadly recognized 
as a country of dispersed ownership) more than 40% of the public corporations in the S&P500 
can be classified as family firms (Chen et al. 2013).  
As a consequence, in the last three decades, research on family firms has grown in 
importance among scholars, with prominent studies appearing at the end of the past century. 
In the Italian academic history, early works regarding family firms are Tomaselli (1996), and 
Corbetta (1998). In the past decade, family business studies have become important also at 
international level. For instance, some studies have firstly documented the diffusion of family 
ownership worldwide (Faccio and Lang, 2002), while others, although failing to obtain 
unambiguous empirical evidence, have found evidence for a higher financial performance of 
family controlled firms as compared to non-family firms (see, e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
McConaughy, et al., 2001; Sraer and Thesmar, 2010).  
The definition of what constitute a family firm is somewhat ambiguous in the 
literature. Family firms could be small businesses held by a family, but also large 
multinational firms. My work defines family firms, consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., 
Volpin, 2002; Tiscini, 2008; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006; Brunello et al., 2001, 2003), as publicly traded companies, which are directly 
controlled by one or more families, or by an individual who has publicly disclosed his 
intention to pass the baton to one of his relatives. 
Research on family-owned companies typically focuses on the conflict between 
majority shareholders (the controlling family) and minority shareholders, also know as Type 
II agency problem (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). These studies show that typical agency 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers (Type I) are mitigated by family 
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ownership. In fact, different from widely held non-family firms, the ownership structure of 
family-owned companies allows the controlling family to monitor more easily the CEO (who, 
often, is a member of the controlling family). Furthermore, the family holds significant 
power, given the concentrated ownership, that may occasionally lead to collusion between 
managers and the controlling family (Brunello et al., 2001). The Chief Executive Officer (i.e., 
the CEO) may collude with the dominant family, extracting rents from minority shareholders, 
even in cases where he/she is an externally hired professional manager (Zingales, 1994; 
Volpin, 2002). Minority shareholders usually provide a great percentage of the firm’s capital, 
but are often deprived of a real influence on the management of the firm. Frequently family-
owned firms engage in transaction with other family-related businesses, subtracting corporate 
funds from minority shareholders. In such situations, effective corporate governance 
protecting minority shareholders is needed. Moreover, recent studies (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2007; Tiscini, 2008; Berrone et al., 2012) have outlined that family firms present some 
peculiarities with respect to the family’s (or the CEO in cases where he is a family member) 
aim at non-financial benefits (i.e. Socioemotional benefits, or/and idiosyncratic benefits of 
control). 
This dynamic opens the field to research regarding corporate governance in family-
owned firms, because these family firm’s characteristics logically lead to impact the corporate 
governance of the firm. As a consequence, some traditionally studied mechanisms of 
corporate governance may work differently in family-owned firms when compared to non-
family firms. 
The literature on executive compensation, for instance, is mainly tied to widely held 
public companies and to the Type I agency problems (conflicts of interests between managers 
and owners). Many authors 1  have examined the importance of managerial incentives in                                                         
1 See, e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt’s (1985) Murphy (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Mehran (1995), 
Aggrawal et al. (1999), Core et al. (1999) Bebchuk and Grinstein (2010). 
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achieving benefits for the shareholders and, as a consequence, improving the firm’s 
performance. Their findings point to the existence of executive compensation contracts, based 
on incentives for performance, reducing the costs associated with the Type I agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. Hence, these results point to the necessity to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders in order to incentivize managers to create value for the 
owners. On the other hand, in family owned companies the ownership concentration and the 
easier monitoring (by the family on the board of directors) should lead to a reduction of the 
agency problems between managers and shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Moreover, for cases in which the CEO is a member of the controlling family the interests of 
owners should coincide with the ones of managers. As a consequence, we should expect that 
the typical mechanism of aligning interests of managers and shareholders (i.e. the sensitivity 
of CEO pay to performance) might work differently in family-owned firms when compared to 
non-family firms. 
Another relevant corporate governance mechanism is CEO turnover. The likelihood of 
CEO dismissal in light of poor firm performance is often considered indicative of whether a 
firm is well governed; in fact, well-governed firms are more likely to dismiss their CEOs for 
poor performance than are poorly governed firms (Kaplan, 1994). Accordingly, several 
studies have empirically documented a negative association between CEO turnover and firm 
performance in public corporations. This literature is premised on the idea that poor firm 
performance leads firm owners to infer that their manager’s ability to create shareholder value 
is lower than a potential replacement’s, leading them to replace their CEO. However, the 
likelihood of a CEOs’ performance related dismissal is also affected by the diligence with 
which executive performance is monitored and acted upon by owners, i.e. their firms’ 
governance systems. The ability of owners to replace poorly performing management is, in 
turn, affected by their effective control over firm governance. The law and finance literature 
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documents that ownership structures that concentrate power in the hands of controlling 
shareholders, often-family members, limit the ability of other (minority) shareholders to 
discipline management (La Porta et. al, 1999). In some instances, controlling shareholders 
further enhance their control of the firm by appointing family members as chief executives 
(Volpin, 2002). This could create differences in the likelihood of CEO turnover between 
family and non-family controlled companies. 
Finally, another important corporate governance mechanism is the one regarding the 
punishment of the managers’ opportunistic behavior of misrepresenting the firm’s financial 
performance in order to achieve selfish objectives, i.e. the earnings management. The 
literature on earnings management focuses extensively on the expected costs that earnings 
management imposes on shareholders. Haley and Wahlen (1999) define earnings 
management as the alteration of a firm’s reported economic performance by insiders to either 
mislead stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes. Along this line, much of the past 
research examines manager’s expected private benefits from engaging in earnings 
management 2. Many previous studies show that the managerial incentive to misrepresent 
firm’s financial performance through earnings management arises, in part, from the conflict of 
interest between the firm’s managers and shareholders (Type I) and the information 
asymmetry associated with this separation. Hence, it could be an opportunity to expand on the 
issue of corporate governance and earnings management using family firms, in which the 
traditional Type I agency problem has been shown to be mitigated. As a consequence, the 
extreme corporate governance mechanism aim at preventing/punishing such opportunistic 
behavior (i.e. the CEO turnover) might work differently in family-owned firms when 
compared to non-family firms. 
                                                        2 see, e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Chung 2002; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Hazarika et al. 
2012; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Leuz et al. 2003; Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2012. 
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From this standpoint, this dissertation aims at filling a gap in the business literature by 
investigating some unstudied family firms’ corporate governance issues, and providing 
empirical and theoretical contribution to the field of family business. The analysis is empirical 
archival, based on a hand-collected sample of non-financial Italian publicly traded companies 
from 2006 to 2010. In this setting of family and non-family firms, I developed my work 
studying how family ownership may affect corporate governance mechanisms behind CEO 
compensation, CEO turnover, and earnings management. As a consequence, this dissertation 
is divided into three main Chapters. 
In Chapter 1, I analyze the CEO compensation in family and non-family firms, and I 
study the sensitivity of CEO pay to performance. I find CEO pay for performance sensitivity 
being higher for non-family firms with dispersed ownership than for family firms. The lower 
agency conflict of family-owned firms, and the easier monitoring on the board of directors 
explain the results. Furthermore, within family-owned firms, the pay for performance 
sensitivity of professional CEOs is higher than the pay for performance sensitivity of family 
CEOs, because family CEOs incentives are tightly aligned with those of the controlling 
family, and they are also motivated by the preservation of the corporate control. Robustness 
tests rule out competing hypotheses that family rent extraction purposes, or similar level of 
ownership concentration (i.e. the blockholder-controlled firms), may drive the results. Finally, 
this part of my dissertation demonstrates that, in the Italian sample, accounting performance is 
more important than stock market returns in setting the CEO pay for both family and non-
family firms. 
In Chapter 2, I begin by examining the likelihood of performance-related CEO 
turnover in family firms. I find that the likelihood of performance-related turnover is lower in 
family controlled firms as compared to firms with dispersed ownership. However, CEO 
turnover is sensitive to both stock market and accounting performance in non-family firms, 
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but is only sensitive to accounting performance in family-controlled firms.  Furthermore, if 
the CEO is a member of the controlling family, turnover is insensitive to both stock market 
and accounting performance. I provide evidence that family ties drive the lack of sensitivity 
of family-CEO turnover to performance rather than concentrated ownership by blockholders. 
My results are consistent with family ownership exacerbating the conflict between majority 
and minority shareholders, and family ties creating executive entrenchment.  
Finally, I analyze the directional change of performance-related CEO turnover. 
Results show that family firms with family CEOs are more willing to replace the family CEO 
with another family member. However, when the firm reports negative accounting 
performance, the probability that the new CEO is another family member decreases. On the 
other hand, family firms with professional CEOs are more willing to replace professional 
CEOs with another professional manager. Notwithstanding, when the firm reports a negative 
market performance, the probability that the new CEO is a family member increases. I posit 
that in cases of family CEO dismissals due to poor accounting performance, the family may 
feel the need of professional assistance. Also, in cases of dismissed professional CEOs, driven 
by low market performance, a family firm may feel threatened by potential takeovers and may 
appoint a family member to prevent any corporate raiders. 
In Chapter 3, I investigate the moderating effect of family ownership on the relation 
between earnings management and CEO turnover. Consistent with agency theory, I find a 
positive and significant relation between earnings management and CEO turnover in the 
overall sample, the association being primarily driven by non-family-owned firms. In family-
owned firms, I find that the positive relation is reduced. Furthermore, I find the association to 
be insignificant in cases where the CEO is a member of the controlling family. Robustness 
tests rule out competing hypotheses that differences in the propensity of family and non-
family firms to manage earnings and ownership concentration drive my results. The study 
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contributes to our understanding of family ownership driven differences in corporate 
governance systems, a relatively unexamined topic in the literature. 
This dissertation aims to shed new light in the field of corporate governance of family-
owned firms. In particular, I aim to demonstrate that family firms’ characteristics (such as the 
collusion between the controlling family and managers, the benefit of control, and the 
socioemotional wealth) affect some corporate governance mechanisms, moderating the results 
found in widely held non-family firms. Finally, I study conflicts of interests between majority 
and minority shareholders (Type II agency problems), which can lead to collusion between 
the dominant family and managers, and the family’s extraction of private benefits. In this 
regard, I show when and how corporate governance’s mechanisms act to prevent and/or 
punish managers’ opportunistic behavior. 
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CHAPTER 1: Agency Conflicts, Family Ownership, and CEO Pay for 
Performance Sensitivity. 
 
1.1. Introduction  
An extensive literature examines the pay for performance sensitivity of Chief 
Executive Officers (CEO) in widely held public companies. Yet, little is known about the 
level and the sensitivity of pay for performance in firms with a lower degree of agency 
problems, such as family owned companies, as admitted by Villalonga and Amit (2006). On 
the one hand, it is widely known that public companies with dispersed ownership suffer from 
an agency problem (conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders). Family firms, 
on the other hand, are characterized by a lower conflict of interest between managers and 
owners (whose interests sometimes coincide) and by easier monitoring of shareholders on the 
board of directors. 
The aim of this study is to demonstrate that some family firms characteristics, such as 
the lower agency conflicts, the easier monitoring, and the preservation of the family’s benefits 
of control, can induce the controlling family to lower the CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
The family control moderates the need of the incentive alignment mechanism of the CEO pay 
sensitivity to performance; whereas non-family companies with dispersed ownership strongly 
need such mechanism in order to align the interests of the firm’s managers and shareholders. 
Family firms represent a dominant ownership form in the corporate world, 40% of 
U.S. public companies in the S&P500 (Chen et al. 2013). Research on family firms typically 
focuses on the conflict between majority shareholders (the controlling family) and minority 
shareholders. Furthermore, these studies show how agency conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers is mitigated by family ownership. The ownership structure of 
family firms allows the controlling family to more easily monitor the CEO. Moreover, the 
family holds significant power due to the concentrated ownership and this leads to collusion 
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between managers and the controlling family (Brunello et al., 2001). Very often the CEO 
tends to collude with the dominant family, extracting rents from minority shareholders, even 
in cases where the CEO is an externally hired professional manager (Zingales, 1994; Volpin, 
2002). From this standpoint, CEO compensation can serve as an instrument for the purpose of 
extracting rents from minority shareholder, thus, pointing to a lower pay for performance 
sensitivity in family owned firms.  
Optimal contracting theory suggests that when agency conflicts between managers and 
owners arise due to the misalignment of incentives, companies tie CEO compensation to 
performance indicators (high CEO pay-performance sensitivity) that are aligned with the 
interest of shareholders. Nevertheless, in cases of family firms the interests of these two actors 
are aligned via family ties, thus the high pay for performance sensitivity may not be warranted 
(McConaughy, 2000). 
Moreover, for cases in which the CEO is a family member, one should observe an 
even lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Berrone et al. (2012) argues that family owned 
firms are often motivated to also pursue socioemotional wealth goals, such as entrenchment 
or the benefits of control, even if they are not financially rewarded for it. I argue that in the 
specific case of family CEOs, the emphasis put on the preservation of the benefits of control 
is critical in explaining a lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity in family firms. 
I test the for relation between CEO pay performance sensitivity and Family ownership 
using a sample of 1027 firm/year observations of publicly traded Italian firms during the 
years from 2006 to 2010. I show that non-family firms exhibit positive and significant CEO 
pay for performance sensitivity (coefficient of 0.112), while the same relation is reduced in 
family firms, via the interaction term having a negative and significant coefficient of -0.108. 
Additionally, when I examine cases where the CEO is a member of the controlling family, I 
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find an even lower CEO pay for performance sensitivity. I control for both accounting and 
market measures of performance in each of my tests.  
My findings are consistent with the easier monitoring and lower agency conflict in 
family firms and, as a result, the consequent lower need for interests’ alignment and the 
preservation of the benefits of control, rather than rent extraction from minority shareholders. 
Specifically, when a family member is the CEO, the family might use its power to extract 
rents from minority shareholders. In these situations the CEOs would not be paid for achieved 
past performance but instead they would be paid for their family members status. Yet, this is 
not the case. I show that in family firms, family CEOs earn, on average, lower compensation 
than professional CEOs, and they perform on average better. This result is consistent with 
McConaughy (2000), Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003), and Berrone et al. (2012), and the 
preservation of the benefits of control driving behavior in family firms and affecting the 
corporate governance mechanisms of family firms such as the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to performance. 
I further examin the robustness of my results by controlling for blockholder firms. 
These firms have similar ownership concentration of that observed by family firms, but the 
main shareholder is not a family (or a firm controlled by a family), but it is an institutional 
investor such as a common fund, a pension fund, the State, etc. This test aims to role out the 
alternative view that my findings are just driven by the high ownership concentration of the 
family, rather then by the family characteristics mentioned above (i.e. lower agency conflicts, 
easier monitoring, the benefits of control, etc.). Results show that, even though blockholder-
controlled companies experience ownership concentration levels similar to that of family 
firms, they report the same CEO pay-performance sensitivity of non-family firms with 
dispersed ownership, hence rejecting the alternative hypothesis that ownership concentration 
alone explains my results. 
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Finally, I examine the sensitivity of my findings, examining which measure of 
performance is more sensitive to CEO pay in family and non-family firms. I show that in my 
sample of analysis family owned public firms, as well as non-family owned public 
companies, place a lower relative weight on stock market return in CEO pay. This result is 
consistent with stock prices being less informative for firms with concentrated ownership 
(Volpin, 2002). Past research documents that ownership concentration and family ownership 
of firms is more prevalent in countries with weaker shareholder and creditor protection laws, 
then lower capital market development and participation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Zingales, 1996; La Porta et. al., 1999). Consequently, the difference in the relative weight 
placed on accounting returns and stock returns in affecting CEO pay for performance 
sensitivity in family and non-family firms is still an unanswered empirical question. 
This study contributes to the literature on pay for performance sensitivity and family 
firms by providing evidence that lower principle-agent conflict and easier monitoring family 
owners are related to lower CEO pay for performance sensitivity. I provide evidence on one 
of the underlying differences between public companies, with low levels of ownership 
concentration and high degree of agency conflicts, and companies owned by a dominant 
family. I contribute to both the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate governance of 
family firms building on McConaughy (2000), Brunello et al. (2001), Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) by demonstrating that lower agency problems are 
reflected in lower CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Additionally, I empirically examine 
how the preservation of the benefits of control is reflected in the corporate governance 
mechanisms of family firms, such as the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance. I 
provide evidence that lower pay-performance sensitivity of family CEOs is not an instrument 
for rent extraction, but rather an effect of the family’s preservation of the benefits of control. 
The controlling family does not lower the sensitivity of the CEO pay to performance in order 
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to extract private rents at the expense of minority shareholders, but rather in order to preserve 
the private benefits of control. Finally, I show that the accounting performance is, overall, 
more important in setting CEO pay packages as compared market performance in family 
firms which contradicts much of the pay studies done in widely held firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two motivates my 
hypotheses; section three details my sample selection, provides descriptive statistics on my 
variables of interest and discusses my empirical methods. Section 4 discusses results and 
describes several robustness tests of my results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.2. Background and hypotheses development 
 
The literature on executive compensation is mainly tied to the agency theory (conflicts 
of interests between managers and owners) and optimal contracting theory. Many authors 
such as Coughlan and Schmidt’s (1985) Murphy (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Mehran 
(1995), Aggrawal et al. (1999), Core et al. (1999) Bebchuk and Grinstein (2010), have 
examined the importance of managerial incentives in achieving benefits for the shareholders 
and, as a consequence, improving the firm’s performance. Their findings point to the 
existence of executive compensation contracts, based on incentives for performance, reducing 
the costs associated with the agency problems between managers and shareholders. Hence, 
these results point to the necessity to align the interests of managers and shareholders in order 
to incentivize managers to create value for the owners. This stream of research justifies the 
use of incentive plans in order to pursue the final goal of creating shareholder value. Thus, 
optimal contracting theory suggests that, if the contract between executives and owners is 
defined in a proper way, managers would pursue their own interests and contemporarily they 
would create wealth for shareholders, thus the need to correlate pay to performance. 
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On the other hand, in family owned companies the ownership concentration and the 
easier monitoring (by the family on the board of directors) should lead to a reduction of the 
agency problems between managers and shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Moreover, for cases in which the CEO is a member of the controlling family the interests of 
owners should coincide with the ones of managers. These effects seem to be higher for family 
owned firms than for institutional blockholder-owned companies, such as banks, investment 
fund etc., because the family is considered an active shareholder since its investments are, 
usually, undiversified. Instead, by definition institutional investors hold well diversified 
portfolios and, as a consequence, their monitoring is low (Volpin, 2002).  
Based on this difference between family and non-family firms regarding the agency 
problem and monitoring, the first aim of this work is to understand whether or not the 
reduction of the agency conflict is detrimental for the CEO pay for performance sensitivity.  
While a few studies have documented that the remuneration of founding family members 
CEOs is not as high as external professional CEOs (McConaughy, 2000; Gomez-Mejia, 
2003), they do not test for differences between family and non-family firms in the pay for 
performance sensitivity. Non-family companies’ boards of directors are induced to pay high 
remunerations to managers in order to attract talent and compensation for their risk adversion. 
On the other hand, family controlled companies face lower agency conflicts, and experience 
easier monitoring by the controlling family on board of directors, hence the CEO pay for 
performance sensitivity should be lower. 
This consideration leads me to draw the my hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: “given the lower agency conflicts and the easier monitoring of family 
firms as compared to non-family firms, the CEO pay for performance sensitivity is lower for 
family firms than for non-family firms”.  
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In family firms the conflict of interests, as mentioned above, is between majority 
shareholders (the family) and minority shareholders, thus the lower agency problem in family 
owned companies and the easier monitoring made by the family on the board of directors 
should motivate hypothesis 1. Hence, CEO compensation contracts’ function of moderating 
the agency conflicts of interests in family firms should be lower as compared to non-family 
companies. 
The second aim of this research is to study CEO pay for performance sensitivity 
within family controlled companies. Family firms can have two different kinds of CEOs: 
professional (external hired) CEOs, or family member CEOs. The professional CEO, by 
definition, is not a family member. Notwithstanding, the monitoring by the dominant family 
should be reflected in a lower professional CEO pay for performance sensitivity as compared 
to CEOs in non-family firms. However, professional CEOs should still have higher pay-
performance sensitivity when compared to family CEOs. Indeed, for cases in which a family 
manager runs the family firm, the need for interest alignment (the basis of the pay for 
performance sensitivity) should be very low. On the other hand, family CEOs can use their 
compensation contracts in order to extract rents from the minority shareholders, or in order to 
achieve others (nonfinancial) benefits.  
These differences between family firms lead by professional CEOs and the family 
firms lead by family CEOs are addressed to a degree in Berrone et al. (2012). In the study, the 
authors theoretically infer that in family owned firms, more than rent extraction, others 
(nonfinancial) benefits, such as the benefits for control, can better explain the lower pay for 
performance sensitivity of family CEOs. According to Berrone et al. (2012) model, family 
CEOs look for other (nonfinancial) aspects, which can assure them of achieving their 
socioemotional wealth. On the other hand, professional CEOs typically do not look for such 
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kind of endowment. Hence, this issue should induce the controlling family to tie more the 
professional CEO compensation on firm performance than what they do for family CEOs. 
Consequently, I expect that the family CEOs’ pay for performance sensitivity to be 
lower than that of professional CEOs. The former require less pay for performance sensitivity 
in order to align their interests with the controlling family’s than do the professional CEOs, 
and thus the lower sensitivity of their pay to performance.  
These considerations lead me to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: “within family owned firms, the CEO pay for performance sensitivity is 
higher for professional CEOs than for family CEOs”.  
 
 
1.3. Model and Data 
 
Sample 
Given the focus on family ownership’s effect on the CEO pay for performance 
sensitivity, I utilize a hand-collected sample of Italian firms to conduct the study. The reliance 
on Italian firms stems from the high propensity of family ownership in this country, which 
allows me to increase the power of my tests. Specifically, Italy provides a unique institutional 
environment to examine the role of family ties in the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
As a consequence, concentrated ownership by blockholders and families through pyramids 
and cross-ownership is commonplace.  For instance, more than 60% of my sample firms are 
classified as family controlled since a single family owns the highest percentage of the 
outstanding voting shares. Frequently, the CEO of a family-owned firm is also a member of 
the family.  For example, over 30% of CEOs in my sample are members of a controlling 
family. Additionally, previous studies have also relied on the uniqueness of the Italian context 
to examine family business characteristics (Corbetta and Montemerlo, 1999; Volpin, 2002; 
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Brunello et al., 2001; Brunello et al., 2003; Prencipe et al., 2008; Barrios and Macciocchi, 
2013). 
I begin constructing my sample by identifying all companies listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange during the period of 2006 to 2010. From this group I exclude financial firms as well 
as bank holding companies and insurance companies given the different nature of their 
financial statement as well as the regulatory environment in which they operate. In the end, I 
collected data from 221 non-financial Italian firms listed during the period of 2006-2010. This 
sample is reduced during some test given the data requirements discussed below. The 
remained of this section discusses my variables of interest, control covariates, as well as the 
empirical specifications used to test my hypotheses. 
 
CEO Compensation 
In order to examine the CEO pay for performance sensitivity, I hand-collected data 
from the corporate annual reports, because no database with information about CEO 
compensation of Italian companies is available. I define CEO compensation as the cash part 
of the CEO remuneration. The CEO cash compensation is made up of two main parts: salary 
and bonuses.       Salary does not change during the year because it is not linked to any market 
or accounting performance measure, while bonuses are strictly linked to some key financial 
indicators such as net income, ROA, stock market performance etc. For the purpose of this 
study it has been decided to use both parts of the CEO compensation (see Table 1 for details 
and descriptive statistics), with the aim of measuring the effect of the cash part of CEO 
compensation on firm’s performance. I decide to not consider the equity part of cash 
compensation for twofold reason. Firstly, as Tiscini and Raoli (2013) show, equity-based 
compensation is not an efficient instrument of incentive alignment in companies where the 
owners hold a significant part of the outstanding shares (i.e. the family-owned firms). 
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Secondly, as Mehran (1995) shows, companies where a great percentage of the shares are 
held by insiders or outside blockholders (i.e. the family firms or the blockholder-dominated 
firms) use less equity-based compensation. 
 
 
 
Table 1 presents the general summary statistics for the variables of interest for the full 
sample. 
 
Performance Measures and other control variables 
To measure firm performance, I examine the industry-adjusted stock market returns, 
and industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA). The industry-adjusted stock market return 
(Var: Market Performance) is calculated as the 4-quarter average return minus the industry 
return based on DataStream industry level 6 identifiers. The industry-adjusted ROA (Var: 
Accounting Performance) is calculated as net income divided by the book value of total assets 
minus the industry ROA. I decided to test for both, market and accounting performance to 
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make my model robust to any kind of performance measure. Furthermore, I can examine 
whether CEO pay is more sensitive to accounting performance or market performance. 
I also control for other firm characteristics in my test by including additional 
covariates. To control for firm growth opportunities I use the market to book ratio, defined as 
the sum of the book value of debt plus market value of equity divided by the firms total 
assets. Finally, I control for the size of the firm by including the natural log of total assets in 
my tests. All of my accounting and financial covariates have been winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level to reduce the effects of outliers. 
 
Family Firm’s Ownership, Control and Firm Governance Measures 
In order to examine the effects of family ownership on the CEO pay for performance 
sensitivity, I construct a variable to empirically measure the percentage of ownership (control) 
by a family at the firm level. In constructing the measure, I adopt a family ownership 
classification scheme similar to that utilized by Minichilli et al. (2010) and Prencipe et al. 
(2008) in which I identify family controlled companies as firms in which the dominant family 
has some concrete form of controlling power. More specifically, I classified a listed company 
as having family ownership when the dominant family holds the highest percentage of the 
voting rights when compered to all other relevant shareholders listed by CONSOB3, usually 
more than 30% of voting rights. In order to determine family ownership, I personally 
examined the firms CONSOB filings and the two stock market yearbooks for the period 
2006-2010. Operationally, I implement the definition of family control by a dummy variable 
that takes on a value of 1 if a dominant family directly controls the firm and else 0. My 
sample contains roughly 60% family controlled firms, which is in line with the 59% found in 
the Faccio and Lang (2002) study.                                                         3CONSOB is the Italian SEC equivalent and has the list of all the relevant shareholders for the publicly traded 
Italian companies.  
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As displayed in table 2 panel A and B, when I partition the sample based on family ownership 
I get 713 observations in family controlled firms while non-family firms have 314 
observations. Furthermore, even if non tabulated in table 2, the average family ownership 
concentration is about 38% in the sample but the percentage can go as high as 97% in some 
family owned firms.  
Using the search procedure described above, I also hand collect measures of the firms 
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corporate governance to include in my regressions given their apparent relation to the CEO 
pay. Specifically, I obtain information on whether the CEO is a member of the controlling 
family (Family CEO) or rather a professional CEO. I conduct news searches to detect CEOs 
belonging to the dominant family. I create a dummy variable equal to 1 when the family 
firm’s CEO is a family member, and equal to 0 when the family firm’s CEO is a professional 
CEO (see table 3 Panel A and Panel B for detailed descriptive statistics).  
Finally, I obtain a measure of board independence by taking the percentage of 
independent directors for each of the firms in the sample, and I get data about the presence or 
not of the remuneration committee in the board. 
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The Empirical Specification 
As in Jensen and Murphy (1990), and in Ortiz-Molina (2007), I define CEO pay for 
performance sensitivity by the empirical relation between changes in CEO cash compensation 
and changes in shareholder wealth, measured as market return or accounting performance. 
The general form of the model hereby used is as follow: 
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Wjt = β0 + β1Rjt + β2Controljt + εjt, 
 
where j indicates the firm to which the CEO belongs and t denotes the year. W is the 
change in CEO compensation in euros, R is shareholder return, and Control is the vector of 
control variables as defined above. Thus, β1 captures the sensitivity of pay for performance. 
Following previous studies (i.e. Ortiz-Molina, 2007), I use median regression (also known as 
least absolute deviation regression) in this research. 
Agency theory predicts a positive pay for performance sensitivity for CEOs in order to 
solve interests’ misalignment between managers and shareholders. On the other hand, family 
firms experience lower agency conflicts. Family ownership assures easier monitoring by the 
family on the board of directors, and more interests alignment between managers and 
shareholders. As a consequence, I expect a lower pay for performance sensitivity. In order to 
test this first hypothesis I run the following regression: 
 
CEO Compensationi,t = αi + β1(Performance i,t – 1) + β2(Performance*family-firms_dummy i,t 
– 1) + β3(family-firms_dummy i,t – 1) + β4(LogTA i,t – 1) + β5(Market_to_Book i,t – 1) + 
β6(Remuneration_committee i,t – 1) + β7(Perc_Independent_directors i,t – 1)+ε i,t  
 
I examine Hypothesis 2 by running the previous specification adding the family CEO 
dummy and its triple interaction with the family firms dummy and the performance 
(accounting and market) measures variables. I use the magnitude and significance of these 
variables to test for the effects of the CEO’s nature (family or professional CEO) on pay for 
performance sensitivity in family firms. Thus, my empirical model takes the following form: 
 
CEO Compensationi,t = αi + β1(Performance i,t – 1) + β2(Performance*family-firms_dummy i,t 
– 1) + β3(family-firms_dummy i,t – 1) + β4(Performance*family-
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firms_dummy*family_CEO_dummy i,t – 1) + β5(family_CEO_dummy i,t – 1) + β6(LogTA i,t – 1) + 
β7(Market_to_Book i,t – 1) + β8(Remuneration_committee i,t – 1) + 
β9(Perc_Independent_directors i,t – 1)+ε i,t  
 
I report the coefficients for standardized CEO cash compensation (my independent 
variable), standard errors in parenthesis, and coefficients in brackets for each of the variables 
to show the general magnitude of the effect of performance on CEO pay, and in order to help 
with the interpretation.  
 
1.4. Results 
 
The first hypothesis aims to test whether non-family firms with dispersed ownership – 
given their higher agency conflicts – need relative higher CEO pay for performance 
sensitivity as compared to family owned firms. Family firms typically report agency problems 
between majority shareholders (the dominant family) and minority shareholders. As a 
consequence, in family firms the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is 
mitigated by concentrated ownership, which allows the controlling family to better monitor 
the CEO. From this standpoint, agency theory and optimal contracting theory suggest that 
when companies experience agency conflicts between managers and owners due to 
misalignment of incentives (such as for the widely held non-family firms), CEO 
compensation has to be tied to performance (high CEO pay-performance sensitivity). 
Whereas in the case of family firm the interests of the manager are already aligned with those 
of the family through family ties, and hence a high sensitivity of pay for performance is not 
needed (McConaughy, 2000). 
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In table 4 Model 1, I regress the industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA), and its 
interaction with the family firms dummy, on change in CEO cash compensation. I report the 
coefficients for the standardized CEO cash compensation (my independent variable), standard 
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errors in parenthesis, and coefficients in euros in brackets4. The aim of this representation is 
to show the relation between CEO pay and firm performance. Model 1 of table 4 reports 
results for accounting performance (industry-adjusted ROA), model 2 reports results for stock 
market returns, and Model 3 uses both performance measures. 
The results show that a significant difference between family and non-family firms 
exists, supporting my hypothesis 1. The CEO pay for performance sensitivity is positive and 
significant, with positive coefficients of .010 (Model 1) and .015 (Model 2) and significant at 
1% for non-family firms, while the coefficients on the interaction of the family firms dummy 
and industry-adjusted ROA (model 1), or industry adjusted market return (model 2) are 
negative and significant (respectively -.007, and -.014) reducing the CEO pay for 
performance sensitivity for family controlled companies. Additionally, the control for growth 
opportunities, the market to book ratio, is positively and significantly related to changes in 
CEO cash compensation (.007), consistent with findings in previous studies. In Model 3, I 
replicate the analysis using both performance measures, providing additional support to 
hypothesis 1. The relation is higher for non-family firms than for family owned firms with the 
coefficients for the CEO pay-performance sensitivity in non-family firms being positive and 
significant (.112 for ROA, and .015 for market performance) and the coefficients on the 
interaction variable of the family firms dummy and firm’s performance being negative and 
significant (-.108 for ROA, and -.014 for market performance).  
These results allow me to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between family 
and non-family firms and irrespective of the performance measures used. The findings in 
table 1 give support to the thesis that easier monitoring and lower agency problems (typical of 
family controlled companies) are reflected in a lower CEO pay for performance sensitivity. 
Family firms do not require high sensitivity of CEO pay for performance because they have                                                         
4 Coefficients in euros are reported to show the economic effect of the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm’s financial 
performance. 
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other effective instruments to align the managers’ interests with those of the family (for 
example they have the power to directly monitor the board of directors’ activities). On the 
other hand, non-family firms with dispersed ownership face a higher agency conflict of 
interest and as suggested by optimal contracting theory, they need more incentive alignment 
between managers and shareholders. Hence, CEO compensation represents the best solution 
for this purpose.  
Given the lower CEO pay for performance sensitivity found in family firms as 
compared to non-family firms, hypothesis 2 expands the analysis by examining the relation 
within the context of family controlled companies. The CEO in family firms can typically be 
of two different kinds: a family member, or a professional manager. The aim of this second 
analysis is to test whether family CEOs or professional CEOs determines the results showed 
in table 4.  
According to agency theory, the interests of family CEOs coincide with the ones of the 
controlling family. Family firms with family CEOs experience the lowest degree of agency 
conflicts, thus the family could chose to not strongly tie the CEO remuneration on firm 
financial performance, and use CEO compensation as an instrument to extract rents from 
minority shareholders. As a consequence, the family CEOs would not be paid more for 
achieved performance, but rather for their status of family member. Another reason why 
family CEOs can chose to not tie their compensation to firm performance could be that they 
have different incentives (nonfinancial) in managing the firm, as compared to professional 
CEOs. For instance, they can derive non-monetary benefits from their positions, such as 
family identity with the company, which allows also the family to keep being a part of the 
community (McConaughy, 2000; Berrone et al., 2012). For both reasons here mentioned, 
family CEOs pay for performance sensitivity is lower as compared to professional CEOs. 
In fact, when a professional CEO leads the family firm, there are still some agency 
 32 
problems, because the interests of the CEO and those of the family may not coincide. In these 
cases, optimal contracting theory suggests that the firm needs an optimal contract in order to 
align the professional manager’s interests with those of the family, thus I expect to observe a 
higher CEO pay for performance sensitivity as compared that observable for family firms 
with family CEOs.  
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Table 5 displays the empirical results for hypothesis 2, which allow me to reject the 
null hypothesis of no difference between professional CEOs and family CEOs. The CEO pay 
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for performance sensitivity for professional CEOs is higher in cases where I use accounting 
performance alone (Model 1), stock market return alone (Model 2), and when I use both 
performance measures (Model 3). Contemporarily, professional CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity is lower than non-family firms’ CEOs because the coefficients of the family 
dummy-performance interaction are negative and significant, and they capture the effect of 
professional CEOs on pay-performance sensitivity. On the other hand, the interaction 
variables of family firms, family CEO, and performance (both market and accounting) wash 
out the positive CEO pay for performance sensitivity found for professional CEOs and for 
non-family firms, being negative and significant (-.013 in Model 1 using accounting 
performance, and -.011 in Model 2 using market return). These results support hypothesis 2, 
demonstrating that family CEO’s pay for performance sensitivity is lower than professional 
CEO’s one. Indeed, optimal contracting theory suggests that CEO compensation has to be tied 
to performance indicators when the interests of two actors are not aligned. In the case of 
family firms with family CEO, the interests of these two actors are already aligned, thus a 
high sensitivity of pay for performance is not needed. 
However, professional CEOs are not family members, so they need their 
compensation being tied and sensitive to performance. As a consequence, family firms with 
professional CEOs experience high CEO pay for performance sensitivity, while family firms 
with family CEOs report very low level of CEO pay for performance sensitivity. The pay for 
performance sensitivity for professional CEOs in family firms is lower than the pay for 
performance sensitivity for CEOs in widely held public companies. Indeed, even if the agency 
conflict of interests between managers and owners are present in both cases, the family firms 
can better monitor the CEO, hence the CEO pay-performance sensitivity can be reduced. This 
result has never been shown in the past, and represents an important step forward in the 
literature in the understanding of the different behavior of family owned companies regarding 
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some corporate governance aspects. Finally, table 5 provides us with further insights into 
CEO compensation. In column 1 and 2 the family CEO dummy is negative and significant 
respectively at 5% and 1%. This result means that in the full sample, on average, 
compensation is lower for family CEOs.  
 
1.5. Robustness check, Sensitivity Test, and limitations 
 
The findings in table 5 may be subject to alternative explanations. Firstly, the above 
differences in pay for performance sensitivity between professional and family CEOs may be 
due to the rent extraction purpose of the dominant family, or rather to the pursuit of others 
non-financial goals by the family CEO, such as the benefits of control. Given the rent 
extraction hypothesis, I expect to observe higher compensation for family firms with family 
CEOs and relative lower performance as compared to family firms with professional CEOs. 
On the other hand, if I find no differences in performance and lower CEO compensation for 
family CEOs it will give strong evidence to the explanatory power of the family firms’ other 
characteristics, such as the preservation of the private benefits of control, on this issue.  
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Table 6 Panel A and B compares the means of CEO cash compensation, accounting 
performance and stock market return for the three categories of firms hereby studied (non-
family firms, family firms with professional CEOs, and family firms with family CEOs). The 
results reported in table 6 reject the rent extraction purpose of family firms but give strong 
support to my thesis of the preservation of the benefits of control. Indeed, family firms with 
family CEOs do not chose to structure the CEO pay to be less sensitive to performance in 
order to extract rent from the minority shareholders, because on average a family CEO earns 
less than a professional CEO (with a significant difference of 104,308) and perform even 
better, being the difference in stock market return negative and significant at 10% (Table 6, 
Panel B). This finding represents a contribution to the literature (building on Gomez-Mejia et 
al, 2003), and it is very relevant for the understanding of corporate governance system of 
family owned companies, which are the dominate ownership form in the corporate world, yet 
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have receive scant attention in previous academic research on corporate governance.  
Moreover, table 6 Panel A shows that, on average, family firms perform better than 
non-family firms, being the difference of accounting return between family and non-family 
companies negative and significant at 10%. As argued by Berrone et al. (2012) and by Tiscini 
and Raoli (2013) family members do not just pursue selfish objectives. An important 
assumption in this sense is that family CEOs may protect and enhance their socioemotional 
wealth (like the preservation of the private benefits of control) even when they are not 
financially rewarded. The results of table 6 Panel B provide empirical strong support to this 
issue. Family CEOs seem to be more motivated to preserve their socioemotional wealth (such 
as the benefits of control), rather than extract rents from minority shareholders. This 
sensitivity test does not aim to reject the general rent-extraction assumption for family firms, 
but it aims to underline that CEO compensation is not a tool for rent-extraction purposes. 
The second sensitivity test is in order to role out the alternative explanation that my 
results may be driven by ownership concentration rather than by family firm’s characteristics. 
In order to show that ownership concentration alone may not affect the findings of this study I 
implement my analysis by controlling for blockholder-dominated firms. This companies 
experience the same ownership concentration of family firms, but the dominant shareholder is 
not a family but rather an institutional investor (common funds, pension funds, the State, etc.). 
I generate the blockholder firms dummy (see appendix 1 for variable definition) and I interact 
it with the performance measure hereby used. Being institutional blockholders passive 
shareholders, they usually do not monitor the board of directors like the dominant family 
does. Moreover, conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders are still 
commonplace in blockholder-dominated firms, because CEOs interests’ may not coincide 
with those of the company that controls the blockholder firm. Thus, I expect this latter firms 
to report similar CEO pay for performance sensitivity as those observed for non-family firms 
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with dispersed ownership, showed in tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
Results in table 7 strongly support my thesis. Coefficients for interaction between 
blockholder firms dummy and performance measures (industry-adjusted ROA in model 1, 
industry-adjusted stock market returns in model 2, and both performance measures in model 
3) are positive but insignificant. Despite similar level of ownership concentration, 
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blockholder-dominated companies still need high CEO pay-performance sensitivity.  
Blockholder investors are generally assumed to hold well-diversified portfolios, thus 
thay can be assumed to be passive monitors. On the other hand, family owners generally are 
not diversified investors; hence they can be assumed to be efficient and effective monitors. 
Given their undiversified portfolio, their risk is higher as compared to blockholder investors, 
thus they need to monitor the board of directors to assure the achievement of their interests. 
As a result, family firms can lower the pay for performance sensitivity of both professional 
and family CEOs. 
These findings show that ownership concentration alone may not justify a lower 
sensitivity of compensation to firm’s performance. 
The third sensitivity test hereby run is in order to increase the power of my results by 
examining whether the relations between CEO pay and firm financial performance is more 
sensitive to accounting or stock market performance. 
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I posit that family owned firms, as compared to non-family companies, place a lower 
relative weight on stock returns in CEO compensation since stock prices are less informative 
in firms with concentrated ownership. Indeed, past research documents that concentrated and 
family ownership is more prevalent in countries with weaker shareholder and creditor 
protection laws and lower capital market development and participation (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; La Porta et. al., 1999; Zingales, 1996). I run two different models to test the sensitivity 
of CEO pay to the performance measures hereby used. In Model 1 of table 8 I run the 
regression with both accounting and stock market returns on the whole sample, and I find that 
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ROA is weighted more than stock market return. In Model 2 I run the regression adding the 
interaction variables of performance and family firms dummy, getting the same results of 
Model 1. Thus, table 8 displays that in my sample of analysis CEO pay is more sensitive to 
accounting performance than to stock market return. The magnitude and the significance of 
the coefficients of accounting returns are higher than the ones of market returns. This finding 
is intuitive for family firms and is in line with other studies (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). 
Family companies experience easier monitoring and control on board of directors, 
making the accounting measure of performance less noisy as compared to stock market 
returns. This allows family firms to capture all the information disclosed by accounting 
returns, and then to rely more on them. Further, as Mehran (1995) shows, companies where a 
great percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside blockholders (i.e. the family 
firms or the blockholder-dominated firms) use less equity-based compensation, thus market 
performance becomes less relevant in structuring compensations contracts. 
On the other hand, even non-family firms put more weight on accounting performance 
in remunerating their CEOs. These results are consistent with some previous studies 
(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985: Sloan, 1993), and may be explained by the fact that stock 
market return is not an ideal measure of performance. The use of accounting-based 
performance measure in CEO compensation contracts can help CEOs from fluctuation in 
corporate value that are beyond their control. Moreover, in the Italian capital market the stock 
return is mostly a noisy measure of performance for many firms in the sample because many 
stocks suffer a lack of liquidity and infrequent trades (Volpin, 2002). 
Furthermore, non-family firms’ corporate governance system might compensate the 
weight put on stock market returns in evaluating and replacing CEOs (Volpin, 2002; Chen et 
al., 2013) with the weight put on accounting performance in remunerating CEOs. In doing so, 
non-family firms rely on both performance measures in structuring their corporate governance 
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system, while family firms, being their monitoring more efficient, rely more on accounting 
return.  
While the results and robustness test point to the moderating effect of family 
ownership and control on the CEO pay for performance sensitivity, this study is subject to 
limitations on the bases of generalizability. By utilizing the Italian setting given its unique 
characteristics in terms of family ownership, the results are limited as much as the relation 
between family members in the Italian setting differs from those observed in other countries. 
While this is a concern, to my knowledge no empirical data so far has shown family ties to 
significantly differ between countries. Additionally, the positive and significant relation 
hereby showed for widely-held public companies (table 4, Model 1), similar to results found 
in the U.S. firms (Murphy, 1985; Aggrawal & Samwick, 1999; Core et al., 1999), gives 
credence to the generalizability of these findings. 
 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
 
This study demonstrates that CEO pay for performance sensitivity is lower in family 
than non-family firms. The findings are motivated by the lower agency problems and easier 
monitoring of family owned firms. Family controlled firms show less need to align the 
interest of CEO and shareholders, because monitoring by the dominant family is higher than 
the monitoring by shareholders in non-family firms with disperse ownership. Moreover, when 
the CEO is a family member, his interests are aligned with those of the dominant family by 
family ties. Indeed, I find that family CEOs are the ones with the lowest pay for performance 
sensitivity. 
This study makes several contributions. First, it speaks to the firm’s corporate 
governance and agency theory, giving empirical evidence that the incentive alignment role of 
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compensation plans, as predicted by optimal contracting theory, is mitigated when the 
interests of the principal and agent are aligned, or when monitoring is high as is the case of 
family owned firms. Second, I show that, within family firms, family member CEOs pay-
performance sensitivity is lower as compared with professional CEOs. Furthermore, family 
member CEOs have lower compensation on average, but perform better as compared with 
professional CEOs. This insight is crucial in explaining how the family’s preservation of the 
benefits of control affects governance mechanisms. Additionally, these findings help to 
explain the environment of family owned firms that are the dominate ownership form in the 
corporate world, yet have receive scant attention in previous academic research on corporate 
governance.  
Finally, this study also sheds light on the importance of different performance 
measures in structuring CEO compensation. In fact, I demonstrate that family companies put 
more weight on accounting performance (such as return on assets) than on stock market 
return. Family companies experience easier monitoring and control on board of directors, 
making the accounting measure of performance less noisy as compared to stock market 
returns. This allows family firms to capture all the information disclosed by accounting 
returns, and rely more on them. 
 
 44 
Table A1 
 Description of Variables 
 
Variable Definitions 
Change in CEO Cash Compensation The dependent variable, calculated as cash CEO compensation at year t 
minus cash CEO compensation at year t-1 
Accounting Performance The industry-adjusted Return on Assets, calculated as net income divided 
by book value of total assets 
Market Performance The industry-adjusted stock market return calculated as the 4-quarter 
average return the year before the CEO Compensation minus the 
contemporaneous industry return based on DataStream industry level 6 
identifiers. 
Family*Accounting Performance The interaction variable calculated as Family firms dummy times 
industry-adjusted ROA 
Family*Market Performance The interaction variable calculated as Family firms dummy times 
industry-adjusted stock market return 
Family*Family CEO*Accounting 
Performance 
The triple interaction variable calculated as Family firms dummy times 
Family CEO dummy times industry-adjusted ROA 
Family*Family CEO*Market Performance The triple interaction variable calculated as Family firms dummy times 
Family CEO dummy times industry-adjusted stock market return 
Blockholder*Accounting Performance The interaction variable calculated as blockholder dominated firms 
dummy times industry-adjusted ROA 
Blockholder*Market Performance The interaction variable calculated as blockholder dominated firms 
dummy times industry-adjusted stock market return 
Blockholder dominated firms dummy The dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a blockholder dominated 
firm, and equal to 0 otherwise.  
Family firms dummy The dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a family dominated firm, 
and equal to 0 otherwise.  
Family CEO dummy Dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if a member of the 
controlling family acts as CEO, and 0 if a Professional CEO (no Family 
member) act as CEO. 
Log Total Assets The natural logarithm of total Assets. 
Market to Book ratio The sum of the book value of debt plus market value of equity divided 
by the firms total assets.  
Remuneration Committee The dummy variable equal to 1 when the Board of Directors has 
nominated a Remuneration committee, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
(%) Independent Directors Calculated as the number of the independent directors on the board 
divided by the number of the board's members.  
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CHAPTER 2: Executive Turnover and Familial Relations: Family Controlled 
Firms and Family CEOs in Italy 
  
1.1. Introduction 
The likelihood of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) dismissal in light of poor firm performance 
is often considered indicative of whether a firm is well governed; in fact, well-governed firms 
are more likely to dismiss their CEOs for poor performance than are poorly governed firms 
(Kaplan, 1994). Accordingly, several studies have empirically documented a negative 
association between CEO turnover and firm performance in public corporations. 5  This 
literature is premised on the idea that poor firm performance leads firm owners to infer that 
their manager’s ability to create shareholder value is lower than a potential replacement’s, 
leading them to replace their CEO. However, the likelihood of a CEOs’ performance related 
dismissal is also affected by the diligence with which executive performance is monitored 
and acted upon by owners, i.e. their firms’ governance systems. The ability of owners to 
replace poorly performing management is, in turn, affected by their effective control over 
firm governance. The law and finance literature documents that ownership structures that 
concentrate power in the hands of controlling shareholders, often-family members, limit the 
ability of minority shareholders to discipline management (La Porta et. al, 1999).6 In some 
instances, controlling shareholders further enhance their control of the firm by appointing 
family members as chief executives (Volpin, 2002).  
In this work, I empirically examine how family control and CEOs’ relationship with 
controlling family owners affect the likelihood of performance-related CEO turnover. I posit 
that family control and whether the CEO is a member of the controlling family potentially 
                                                        
5 See for example Weisbach (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Volpin (2002), Dikolli, et. al. (2013) and 
Jenter and Lewellen (2010). 
6 Recent studies have shown that family firms represent a high portion of both public and private companies 
worldwide (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chen et al. 2013). 
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affect the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and also between controlling 
and minority shareholders. The presence of a controlling family entrenches majority 
shareholders thereby weakening the disciplining role of the market (Shleifer and Vishny 
1986; Zingales 1994). Family control potentially has two competing effects on the manager-
shareholder agency conflict.  First, family firm owners do not hold a well-diversified 
portfolio, thus their wealth is strongly correlated to the financial performance of the firm. As 
a consequence, controlling families are likely better monitors of executive activity, which 
reduce the free-rider problems typical of widely held public corporation (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). This suggests that the agency conflict between managers and shareholders is lower in 
family controlled firms, thereby causing a higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor firm 
performance. In contrast, however, the controlling family’s significant power due to its 
concentrated position potentially lowers their incentive to monitor the CEO if the parties 
collude to expropriate minority owners (Brunello et al., 2003). Further, controlling owners 
are likely to less intensely monitor a family-member CEO since they are more certain about 
their executive ability (Dikolli et. al. 2013). This implies that the likelihood of performance-
related CEO turnover is lowered by the presence of a controlling family and family ties 
between a CEO and firm owners. 
A related issue in studying the performance-turnover relation in family controlled firms is the 
choice of performance measure that is used by owners in evaluating a CEO (Engel et. al. 
2003).  I posit that family owned firms place a lower relative weight on stock returns in CEO 
evaluation since stock prices are less informative in firms with concentrated ownership. Past 
research documents that concentrated and family ownership of firms is more prevalent in 
countries with weaker shareholder and creditor protection laws that lower capital market 
development and participation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et. al., 1999; Zingales, 
1996).  However, it is unclear whether owners would evaluate their CEO based on 
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accounting performance, since firms’ accounting earnings are also shown to be less 
informative in countries with weaker legal investor protection and family firm ownership 
(Leuz et. al., 2003; Fan and Wong, 2002). On the other hand, accounting performance is 
potentially weighted higher than stock price if controlling family owners have more precise 
knowledge of the “true” accounting performance of the firm.  Consequently, the difference in 
the relative weight placed on accounting earnings and stock returns in affecting CEO 
turnovers in family and non-family firms is an unanswered empirical question. 
Another relevant and unstudied issue hereby analyzed is the one regarding the directional 
change of performance related CEO turnover (i.e. who serves as the new CEO after the CEO 
turnover). Is the CEO turnover from a family member to another, from a family member to a 
professional, or from a professional to a family member? This analysis can help in the 
understanding of the real corporate governance mechanisms driving family companies. I aim 
to provide evidence regarding which performance measure lead to a change from a 
professional CEO to a family CEO (and vice-versa), and to understand the underlying 
reasons. 
I test my hypotheses using a sample of 2217 unique public corporations in Italy during the 
2006 to 2010 period.  For several reasons Italy provides a unique institutional environment to 
examine to role of family ties in the effectiveness of corporate governance.  It is widely 
considered as a country with weak laws protecting minority shareholders and creditors, little 
bank governance and poorly functioning capital markets (La Porta et. al., 1999; Zingales, 
1994).  As a consequence, concentrated ownership by blockholders and families through 
pyramids and cross-ownership is commonplace.  For instance, over 60% of my sample firms 
are classified as family controlled since a single family owns more than 50% of the 
                                                        7 This is the number of firms at the last year of observation (2010). 
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outstanding voting shares.  Frequently, the CEO of a family-owned firm is also a member of 
the family.  For example, over 30% of CEOs in my sample are members of a controlling 
family.   
In the full sample (family and non-family firms) I document an inverse relation between the 
likelihood of CEO turnover and negative firm performance as measured by both the stock 
returns and accounting earnings. However, the likelihood of performance related CEO 
turnover is significantly smaller in family-controlled firms than in non-family firms. Further, 
CEO turnover likelihood is insensitive to both stock returns and accounting earnings for 
CEOs that are members of the controlling family, and is sensitive to accounting performance 
only for non-family member (professional) CEOs. Results suggest that, in evaluating CEOs, 
non-family firms weight market performance more than they do accounting performance, 
whereas family firms rely solely on accounting performance, but only when their CEO is not 
a family member. 
Moreover, I distinguish between non-family firms with dispersed ownership and those that 
are blockholder-dominated in order to role out the alternative explanation that the lower 
performance-turnover sensitivity of family firm CEOs is due to concentrated ownership 
rather than familial relations. Empirical results show that in blockholder-dominated firms 
CEO turnover is as sensitive to stock market and accounting performance as in non-family 
firms with dispersed ownership, whereas the performance-turnover sensitivity in family 
controlled firms is considerably lower.  I propose that a lower performance-turnover 
sensitivity in family firms, than in firms with dominant blockholders, is due to familial 
relations between the CEO and the controlling owners since family firms and blockholder-
dominated firms have, on average, the same ownership concentration.  
Finally, I analyze the directional change of performance related CEO turnover. My results 
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show that family firms with family CEO are more willing to replace the family CEO with 
another family CEO. However, when the firm reports a negative accounting performance, the 
probability that the new CEO is another family member decreases. On the other hand, family 
firms with professional CEOs are more willing to replace professional CEOs with another 
professional CEO. Notwithstanding, when the firm reports a negative market performance, 
the probability that the new CEO is a family member increases. I posit that for cases of 
dismissed family CEOs for poor accounting performance, the family may feel that they need 
professional assistance. Also, for cases of dismissed professional CEOs for low market 
performance, a family firm may feel threatened by potential takeovers and may appoint a 
family member to prevent any corporate raiders. 
This work makes several contributions to the literature on performance-turnover relation for 
CEOs of public corporations. First, it highlights the importance of family ownership on the 
CEO turnover-performance relation by documenting that executive turnover is less sensitive 
to performance in the presence of controlling family ownership. Second, it shows that non-
family firms put greater weight on stock market performance than accounting measures of 
performance, while family firms rely solely on accounting measures in making CEO 
replacement decisions. Third, it documents that the CEO turnover relation is insensitive to 
firm stock market and accounting performance when the CEO is a member of the controlling 
family.  Thus, the empirical measure of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance 
among family owned firms is driven solely by turnover among non-family member CEOs.  
Forth, it shows that it is the family tie of the CEO to the founding family rather than the 
family’s concentrated ownership that lower the likelihood of performance-related dismissal, 
since CEOs of firms with significant blockholders are as likely to be dismissed for poor 
performance as are CEOs of firms with dispersed ownership. Finally, I show that family 
firms decide to replace a family CEO with a professional CEO just when they need 
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professional assistance (i.e. in cases of bad accounting performance). Instead, family firms 
replace a professional CEO with a family CEO in cases of low stock market returns, hence 
when the family feels threatened by potential takeovers and decide to appoint a family 
member in order to prevent any corporate raiders. 
Admittedly, the lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance in family controlled firms 
has been documented by prior research. Volpin (2002) shows that Executive turnover is less 
sensitive to stock returns in Italian family controlled firms. However, his work is more about 
executive turnover than CEO turnover. His definition of executive turnover is too broad, 
because just when half of the executive are dismissed the dummy variable that takes value 1. 
This implies that the year where the CEO is replaced and the other executives are not, he 
does not record a turnover. Whereas, this work is testing the turnover-performance sensitivity 
for the most important position in the board, the Chief Executive Officer. In addition, this 
work distinguishes between CEOs that are family members and those that are professional 
(no family ties) so as to identify whether familial relations or concentrated ownership causes 
the dampening of the performance-turnover relation.  More recently, Chen et. al. (2013) 
document that performance-turnover sensitivity is lower among family owned U.S. firms 
with a family member as CEO than in those with a professional CEO.  However, they do not 
examine the relative weights placed on accounting and stock market performance.  Further, 
their sample comprises of publicly traded U.S. firms, operating in a well-functioning capital 
market with strong legal protection of minority shareholders and creditors. As a result, U.S. 
firms do not have significant family ownership concentration.  For instance, the average 
family ownership in firms that are classified as family-owned, which is almost half the 
sample, is only 20%.  In contrast, family ownership in my sample of family owned firms 
(50% of my sample) is over 60% of voting stock. Finally, this paper is completely innovative 
in analyzing whether family ties of the CEO to the founding family rather than the family’s 
 55 
concentrated ownership lower the likelihood of performance-related dismissal, and it is 
innovative in providing evidence about the reasons that lead the family firms to replace a 
family CEO with a professional CEO or vice-versa.  
This paper is organized as follow. The following section develops the hypotheses; section 3 
details sample selection and provides descriptive statistics on my variables of interest. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical methods and results and describes several tests of the 
robustness of the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.2. Hypotheses development 
My hypotheses are premised on the notion that corporate financial performance discloses 
information about the CEO’s ability to create value for shareholders. A plethora of studies 
have explored the relation between CEO turnover and financial performance relying on the 
same premise, founding that firm performance is negatively related to the probability of CEO 
dismissal (Kaplan, 1994; Brickley, 2003; Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; 
Farrel and Whidbee, 2003). I verified this baseline assumption on the full sample and move 
on to study whether there are significant differences between family controlled firms and 
non-family firms.  
The Italian capital market is characterized by numerous family controlled firms where these 
family shareholders control at least 20% of the firm’s voting rights8 (Volpin, 2002). Within 
these family firms, there exist differences depending on the relationship between the firm’s 
management (i.e. the CEO) and the controlling family. For instance, the CEO may be a 
member of the family or can be an external professional CEO hired from the external labor 
market. Additionally, non-family firms may present some different peculiarities too. They                                                         8 Excluding banks as well as insurance companies because their accounting measure of performance are not 
comparable with the other companies. 
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may be controlled by a dominant shareholder not identifiable as a family, i.e. the state, a 
foreign company, an investment or pension fund, etc., or rather they may not have any large 
controlling shareholder. I define the first category as blockholder-dominated firms, and the 
second as widely held public companies or publicly held non-family firms. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study I divide my sample into four categories of firms: family firms with 
family CEO, family firms with professional CEO, blockholder-dominated non-family firms, 
and publicly held non-family firms. 
The family and non-family firms differences may be viewed as being driven by the varying 
levels in the entrenchment and in the monitoring of the CEO by the controlling family. 
Further, the difference between family and non-family firms about the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity is still an open field of research. On the one hand, family’s 
monitoring is effective because the family has the expertise, the incentive and the means to 
do so (Chen et al., 2013). The controlling family does not hold a well-diversified portfolio, 
and their wealth is strongly correlated to the financial performance of the firm. This suggests 
that the agency conflict between managers and shareholders is lower in family controlled 
firms, thereby causing a higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor firm performance. On the 
other hand, in family owned business the agency conflict is of the type II, between the family 
and the minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). In this case the family should aim to 
extract rents from minority shareholders, and may not be willing to replace poor performing 
CEO if he is colluding with the family in extracting benefits from the other shareholders. As 
a consequence, I expect to observe a lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in family 
owned companies as compared to non-family firms.  
This study aims to posit that family ties prevail and lower the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance. Stated formally, the first hypothesis of my work is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: family owned companies are less likely to dismiss a CEO for poor financial 
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performance than non-family firms. 
Within family owned companies, when a member of the controlling family holds the CEO 
position, the interests of the manager and the family are further aligned. Thus, with 
considerable influence from the family CEO over the Board’s decisions, the controlling 
family can extract private benefits or rents from the minority shareholders. On the other hand, 
retaining the poorly performing CEO is not costless to the family, because the reiterate poor 
performance may reduce the family ownership’s value in the firm, and it may expose the firm 
to potential takeovers. 
In contrast, when an external professional manager holds the CEO position in a family owned 
firm, there is a separation of management and ownership, leading to the traditional agency 
problems between the professional CEO and the family. This is similar to non-family firms in 
which the separation between management and control is always present. Nevertheless, the 
direct monitoring of the CEO by the dominant family is what distinguishes a family firm with 
a professional CEO from other non-family firms. In the family controlled case, the dominant 
family has a deep knowledge of the business, more than any other shareholders (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003). As a consequence, it is far easier for family owners to evaluate whether the 
professional CEO is competent or not. Therefore, there are two forces that may influence the 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in family firms: on the one hand there is the 
entrenchment that retain the family from CEO dismissal, while on the other hand there is the 
effective monitor by the controlling family that enhance the dismissal of a poor performing 
professional CEO. Consequently, the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity should be higher 
in family owned firms with professional CEOs than in family firms with family CEOs. 
Stated formally, my second hypothesis is as follow: 
Hypothesis 2: family owned companies are less likely to dismiss a family member CEO for 
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poor financial performance than they are to dismiss a professional CEO.  
Furthermore, I examine whether family owned firms place a lower or higher relative weight 
on market returns or accounting earnings as compared to non-family companies in the 
evaluation of a CEO’s performance. In fact, the sensitivity of CEO turnover on accounting 
return or market return should be different across the categories of firms hereby studied. As a 
consequence of the different agency conflicts (type I vs. type II) and the intensity of 
monitoring I expect more weight on some performance measures rather than others. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that the family firms place, overall, a lower relative weight on 
market returns in CEO evaluation since stock prices are less informative in firms with 
concentrated ownership. Thus, accounting performance should be potentially weighted higher 
than stock marker performance if the controlling family owners have more precise 
knowledge of the real accounting performance of the firm, as stated by Anderson and Reeb 
(2003). This difference in the relative weight placed on accounting earnings and stock market 
returns in CEO turnovers between family and non-family firms is still an unanswered 
empirical question. I stand for more weight on accounting performance in family owned 
companies because of the effective monitoring by the family, whereas in the non-family 
firms the weight on stock market performance should be greater than that on accounting 
performance. 
Finally I examine the reasons why family firms decide to replace a family CEO with a 
professional CEO or vice-versa. I hypothesize that family firms rely more on accounting 
performance than market performance in replacing a poor performing family CEO. I posit 
that for cases of bad accounting returns, the family may feel to need the assistance of a 
professional manager; hence the family CEO will be replaced by a non-family member CEO. 
On the other hand, poor stock market performing professional CEOs in family firms will be 
replaced by family manager because the family may feel threatened by potential takeovers 
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and may decide to appoint a family member in order to prevent any corporate raiders. 
 
1.3. Sample and data 
 
Sample 
Given the focus on family ownership’s effect on the CEO turnover-performance relation, I 
utilize a hand-collected sample of Italian firms to conduct the study. The reliance on Italian 
firms stems from the high propensity of family ownership in the Italian context, which allows 
me to increase the power of my tests. Additionally, previous studies have also relied on the 
uniqueness of the Italian context to examine various characteristics of family businesses 
(Brunello et al., 2001; Volpin, 2002). I begin constructing my sample by identifying all listed 
companies on the Italian Stock Exchanges during the period of 2006 to 2010. From this 
group I exclude financial firms as well as bank holding companies and insurance companies 
given the different nature of their financial statement as well as the regulatory environment in 
which they operate. Thus, I collected data from 221 non-financial Italian firms listed during 
the period of 2006-2010. This sample will be further reduced during some of the tests given 
the data requirements discussed below. The remained of this section discusses the variables 
of interest, control covariates, as well as the empirical specifications used to test the 
hypotheses. 
 
CEO Turnover 
I construct my measure of CEO turnover at the firm level by identifying the CEOs for all 
firms list on the Italian Stock Exchanges during the period of 2006-2010. I utilize the annual 
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firm filings with CONSOB9, two Italian stock exchange yearbooks (Calepino dell’Azionista 
and the Taccuino dell’Azionista), as well as information from the Borsa Italiana (the Italian 
Stock-exchange) to identify the years in which there was a CEO change at the company. I 
define my turnover variable as a dummy equal to one in the year in which the CEO changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: PANEL A 
Frequencies of Forced Turnovers. 
This table reports the total number of forced CEO turnovers in 
the sample from 2006 to 2010. 
Year No turnover Forced Turnover Total 
    
2006 165 17 182 
 91% 9% 100% 
2007 168 35 203 
 83% 17% 100% 
2008 195 18 213 
 92% 8% 100% 
2009 183 33 216 
 85% 15% 100% 
2010 202 19 221 
 91% 9% 100% 
TOTAL 913 122 1035 
  88% 12% 100%                                                         9 CONSOB is the Italian SEC equivalent and has the list of all the relevant shareholders for the publicly traded 
Italian companies. 
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Given the lack of information on the causes of turnover from the public sources, I conduct 
news searches to eliminate turnovers due to death and retirements, which may introduce 
noise in the analysis, reducing my sample of turnovers to 122. Table 1 Panel A summarizes 
the turnover sample of 122 turnovers during the sample period by year. The non-turnover 
sample of firms includes all remaining non-financial listed Italian firms during the time 
period. This yields to a total sample of 221 firms in the year 2010, corresponding to 1035 
firm/year observations. 
 
Firm Family Ownership Control and Firm Governance Measures 
In order to examine the effects of family ownership on the CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity, I construct a variable to empirically measure the percentage of ownership 
(control) by a family at the firm level. In doing so, I personally examined the firms CONSOB 
filings and the two stock market yearbooks for the period 2006-2010. Further, I adopt a 
family ownership classification scheme in which it is really identifiable family controlled 
companies as firms where the dominant family has more than 50% of controlling power. 
Operationally, I implement the definition of family control by a dummy variable that takes on 
a value of 1 if a dominant family directly controls the firm and else 0. My sample contains 
roughly 60% family controlled firms, which is in line with the 59% found in the Faccio and 
Lang (2002) study. 
    
TABLE 1: PANEL B 
Frequencies of Forced Turnovers in Family Firms. 
This table reports the total number of forced CEO turnovers in 
the sample from 2006 to 2010, for the Family Firms Sub-
Sample. 
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Year No turnover Forced Turnover Total 
    
2006 99 13 112 
 88% 12% 100% 
2007 108 25 133 
 81% 19% 100% 
2008 134 8 142 
 94% 6% 100% 
2009 121 21 142 
 85% 15% 100% 
2010 131 13 144 
 91% 9% 100% 
TOTAL 593 80 673 
  88% 12% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: PANEL C 
Frequencies of Forced Turnovers in Non-Family Firms. 
This table reports the total number of forced CEO turnovers in 
the sample from 2006 to 2010, for the Non-Family Firms Sub-
Sample. 
Year No turnover Forced Turnover Total 
    
2006 66 4 70 
 94% 6% 100% 
2007 60 10 70 
 86% 14% 100% 
2008 61 10 71 
 86% 14% 100% 
2009 62 12 74 
 84% 16% 100% 
2010 71 6 77 
 92% 8% 100% 
TOTAL 320 42 362 
  88% 12% 100% 
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As displayed in table 2 panel A and B, when I partition the sample based on family 
ownership I get 673 observations in family controlled firms while non-family firms have 362 
observations.  
Using the search procedure described above, I also hand collect measures of the firms 
corporate governance to include in the descriptive statistics. Specifically, I obtain information 
on whether the CEO is a member of the controlling family (Family CEO) or is a professional 
CEO. I create a dummy variable equal to 1 when the family firm’s CEO is a family member 
and 0 when the family firm’s CEO is a professional CEO (see table 2 Panel C and Panel D 
for detailed descriptive statistics).  
Finally, I obtain a measure of board member independence by taking the percentage of 
independent board members for each of the firms in the sample as well as, using the search 
procedure described above, hand collect various measures of the firms corporate governance 
to include in the regressions given their apparent relation to turnover from previous literature, 
for instance if the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors (CEO Duality), as well as 
the CEO’s age.  
 
Performance Measures and other control variables 
To measure firm performance, I examine the industry adjusted stock market returns, and the 
firm’s accounting performance. The industry adjusted stock return (Var: Market Return) is 
calculated as the 4-quarter average return the year before the CEO turnover minus the 
contemporaneous industry return based on DataStream industry level 6 identifiers. The 
accounting performance measure (Var: Accounting Return) is the industry adjusted ROA, 
calculated as net income divided by the book value of total assets. I decided to test for both, 
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market and accounting performance to make my model robust to any kind of performance 
measure. Further, I can examine whether the CEO turnover is more sensitive to accounting 
performance, or to market performance. Performance measures are one year lagged to 
compute the real effect of performance on the CEO dismissal decision. 
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In the descriptive statistics I also include other firm characteristics in order to enrich the 
descriptive power of my analysis regarding the differences between the four main category of 
firms hereby examined: family firms with family CEO, family firms with professional CEO, 
blockholder-dominated firms, and publicly held non-family firms (see table 2). To give 
information about firm’s growth opportunities I use the market to book ratio, defined as the 
sum of the book value of debt plus market value of equity divided by the firms total assets. 
Sales Growth is measured as the percentage change in revenues over the prior year. I control 
for the financial structure of the firm and the effect of debt by including the leverage of the 
firm, defined as the total book value of debt divided by the book value of debt and market 
value of equity. Finally, I control for the size of the firm by including the natural log of total 
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assets in my tests. All of the accounting and financial covariates have been winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level to reduce the effects of outliers. 
However, all the variables of interest are summarized in the Appendix. 
 
 
1.4. Empirical analysis 
 
Primary analysis 
To study the relation between firm’s financial performance and CEO turnover the following 
logistic regression is run over the full sample of firms with the necessary data requirements 
and it is structured as following: 
 
CEO Turnoveri,t = αi + β1(Pos_market_return i,t – 1) + β2(Neg_market_return i,t – 1) + 
β3(Pos_ROA i,t – 1) + β4(Neg_ROA i,t – 1) + β5(Controls i,t – 1) + ε i,t. 
 
I report the coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis and the average marginal effects in 
brackets for each of the variables in the multivariate test to help with the interpretation of the 
relations found. Note that all the independent variables are measured in the year before CEO 
turnover. 
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Table 3 makes my sample robust and consistent with previous studies, with firm performance 
measured as both industry-adjusted market returns and industry-adjusted ROA affecting CEO 
turnover. In the table, I report the coefficients of the interactions, the standard errors in 
parentheses, and the marginal effect for each variable of the analysis in order to assess the 
economic significance of the coefficient estimates. Following what has been done in previous 
studies, I also calculate the marginal effect as the change in the implied CEO turnover 
probability when the variable of changes from its 25th to 75th percentile value, or from 0 to 1 
if the variable is a dummy variable, with all other explanatory variables held constant at their 
respective means.  
As expected, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significant just for negative market 
return (with coefficient of -1.31 and marginal effect of -0.25) and for negative ROA 
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(coefficient of -1.41 and margins -0.27), while the results for positive firm performance are 
not significantly related with CEO turnover. These results are consistent with my predictions 
in the baseline hypothesis. 
Furthermore, these findings strengthen the assumption of Coffee (1999), that successful 
governance systems penalize managers (Chief Executive Officers in this case) for poor 
performance.  
Verifying previous studies findings on the whole sample (giving support to the reliability of 
my Italian sample), I can move on in analyzing how family control and CEOs’ relationship 
with controlling family affects the likelihood of performance-related CEO turnover.  
To study this relation the following logistic regression is run, testing Hypothesis 1 over the 
full sample of firms with the necessary data requirements and structured as following: 
 
CEO Turnoveri,t = αi + β1(Pos_market_return i,t – 1) + β2(Neg_market_return i,t – 1) + 
β3(Pos_ROA i,t – 1) + β4(Neg_ROA i,t – 1) + β5(Family_firms_dummy i,t – 1) + 
β6(Family_firms*Pos_market_return i,t – 1) + β7(Family_firms*Neg_market_return i,t – 1) + 
β8(Family_firms*Pos_ROA i,t – 1) + β9(Family_firms*Neg_ROA i,t – 1) + β10(Controls i,t – 1) + 
ε i,t.  
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Table 4 reports the findings of the main analysis. The first column shows the results for the 
non-family firms sub-sample, the second column reports the results for the family firms sub-
sample, whereas the third column reports the results for the full sample using interaction 
variables to pick up the family control differences. In table 4, I report the coefficients of the 
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interactions, the standard error in parentheses, and the marginal effect for each variable in 
order to assess the economic significance of my estimates. The marginal effect can be viewed 
as the change in the implied CEO turnover probability when the variable changes from its 
25th to 75th percentile value, or from 0 to 1 if the variable is a dummy variable, with all other 
explanatory variables held constant at their respective means.  
As showed in table 4 column 1, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significant for both 
negative industry-adjusted market returns and industry adjusted ROA, with coefficients and 
margins respectively of -2.55 and -0.49 for market returns, and -4.43 and -0.89 for accounting 
performance. This means that a reduction of 4.9% of market returns or a reduction of 8.9% of 
accounting performance will increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal of 10%. These 
findings are in line with the baseline Hypothesis and with previous studies: once the firm’s 
financial performance is reduced, a good corporate governance systems penalize CEOs. 
Table 4 column 2 shows the results for the family firms sub-sample. CEO turnover is 
negatively related with negative industry-adjusted ROA (with coefficient of -1.34 and margin 
of -0.27, both significant at 1%) but not with negative Industry-adjusted market return. This 
finding is expected and it is even more strengthen by what showed in column 3, where I run 
the regression on the full-sample using the interaction variables. The results in column 3 
underline that while CEO turnover is sensitive to both negative industry-adjusted market 
return and negative industry-adjusted ROA for non-family firms (with a negative coefficient 
of -1.32 and negative margin of -0.25 for market return, and a negative coefficient of -3.96 
and negative margin of -0.75 for ROA), for family firms the CEO dismissal is just sensitive 
to negative accounting performance, because the positive and significant coefficient of 3.74 
and the positive and significant margin of 0.71 for the interaction between family firms 
dummy and negative industry-adjusted market returns reduces the negative coefficient and 
margin founded for market return in non-family firms.  
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These results confirm the first hypothesis that family owned companies are less likely to 
dismiss a CEO for poor financial performance than non-family firms. More deeply, what I 
find here is that, comparing the coefficients and margins founded for family and non-family 
firms I can see that CEO dismissal is less likely to occur in family firms as compared to non-
family firms and, even more specifically, family firms prefer accounting performance to 
market performance in replacing bad performing CEO, while non-family companies rely on 
both measure (accounting and market return). In table 4, I highlight the importance of family 
ownership on the CEO performance-turnover relation by documenting that CEO turnover is 
less sensitive to performance in the presence of controlling family ownership. This is due to 
the higher monitoring characterizing family companies. The familial control allows the 
dominant family to deeply assess accounting number, thusly corporate governance 
mechanisms are more grounded on accounting measures than market measures as compared 
to non-family firms.  
Table 4 shows that non-family firms put greater weight on stock market performance than 
accounting measures of performance, whereas family firms rely solely on accounting 
measures in making CEO replacement decisions. In fact, non-family firms shareholder care 
more about the market evaluation because they have a short-term investment horizon. Plus 
the measure provides a greater signal to noise ratio in measuring the CEO’s performance.  
Thus, a CEO of a publicly held non-family firm, who suffers a negative market return, is 
more likely to be replaced. On the other hand, the dominant family of a family own firm does 
not care about capital gains, because of the long-term investment horizon (Andres, 2008). As 
a consequence, the corporate governance of family firms is structured to be more sensitive to 
accounting returns. The analysis gives support to this thesis showing that the CEO 
replacement mechanism for family firms is just related to negative industry-adjusted ROA, as 
documented by the results reported in table 4.  
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Family firms sub sample analysis 
The above analyses indicate that the CEO turnover-performance relation is systematically 
different between family firms and non-family firms. In this section, in order to further 
analyze the main inferences, I explore cross-sectional variation within family firms along the 
dimension of family related CEOs in family firms and external professional CEOs in family 
firms. 
I examine Hypothesis 2 by running the previous specification with the addition of a family 
member CEO indicator and its interaction with the performance variables, using the 
magnitude and significance of these variables to test for the effect of family member CEO on 
CEO dismissal. I run this regression in the family-firms sub-sample: 
 
CEO Turnover i,t = αi + β1(Pos_market_return i,t – 1) + β2(Neg_market_return i,t – 1) + 
β3(Pos_ROA i,t – 1) + β4(Neg_ROA i,t – 1) + β5(Family_CEO_dummy i,t – 1) + 
β6(Family_CEO*Pos_market_return i,t – 1) + β7(Family_CEO*Neg_market_return i,t – 1) + 
β8(Family_CEO*Pos_ROA i,t – 1) + β9(Family_CEO*Neg_ROA i,t – 1) + β10(Controls i,t – 1) + 
ε i,t. 
 
The reason for separating family CEOs from professional CEOs is because the impact of 
family CEO on the turnover-performance sensitivity has to be explored yet. In order to shed 
light on this issue, I separately examine the effect of family CEOs and professional CEOs on 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity.  
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Table 5 documents that the results founded for family firms in the main analysis are mainly 
driven by professional CEOs. In column 1 I report results for the family firms professional 
CEO sub-sample. The CEO turnover performance sensitivity is negative and significant just 
for negative industry-adjusted ROA, with coefficient of -1.46 and margin of -0.26, both 
significant at 1%, being completely in line with what found for family firms in table 4. 
Further, in column 2 I report results for the family firms family CEO sub-sample, showing no 
relation between CEO turnover and performance. In column 3 I find the same evidence: the 
inverted relation between negative industry-adjusted accounting performance (coefficient of -
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1.68 and margin of -0.33, significant at 1%) in family firms sample is reduced by the 
interaction between the dummy variable for family CEOs and negative industry-adjusted 
ROA, with a positive coefficient of 1.98 and a positive margin of 0.39. 
These findings indicate that when a family CEO leads a family owned company, there is no 
significant turnover-performance sensitivity. These results give strong support to the second 
hypothesis, and strengthen the Entrenchment Hypothesis of the Volpin’s paper (2002), where 
the author had not found strong support in favor of different turnover-performance sensitivity 
between family CEOs and external CEOs. I also document that the CEO turnover relation is 
insensitive to the firm’s stock market and accounting performance when the CEO is a 
member of the controlling family, but it is sensitive to industry-adjusted ROA when the CEO 
is external (not a member of the controlling family). Therefore, the empirical measure of the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance among family owned firms is driven solely 
by the turnover among non-family member CEOs.  
Several reasons can explain this finding. First of all, the Chief Executive Officer is the 
highest and most important position in the Board and through it the family can directly 
manage the company and better protect their private benefits (Chen et al., 2013). This can 
induce the dominant family to not replace bad performing family CEOs. Secondly, the family 
usually has a long-term horizon (Andres, 2008), thus it might be willing to give family CEOs 
extra-time to prove themselves, leading to lower turnover-performance sensitivity. Moreover, 
the market may badly reacts to a replacement of the family CEO, because a family member 
should know the family business better than an external manager (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Sensitivity analysis and Robustness check 
In this last subsection, I test findings to possible alternative explanation. 
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First, I explore another important setting in order to investigate whether results about the 
underlined differences in CEO turnover-performance sensitivity between family and non-
family firms are driven by the ownership concentration of family owned companies, or rather 
by the family firms’ peculiar corporate governance characteristics due to familial relations. 
I begin by adding blockholder-dominated firms in the analysis. This last kind of firm reports 
the same ownership concentration of a family firms, but it controlled by a dominant 
shareholder, which is not a family, but an institutional investor, like a common fund, a 
pension fund, etc. In this way, the sample of non-family firms is divided into blockholder-
dominated firms and non-family firms with dispersed ownership (in which no dominant 
shareholder is present, and the shares are widely held) as already explained above. I expect to 
find results supporting my thesis that the differences between family and non-family firms 
are due to familial relations rather than ownership structure. Hence, I expect to find no 
differences between non-family firms with dispersed ownership and blockholder-dominated 
firms. 
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Table 6 reports the findings for the first sensitivity analysis with the blockholder-dominated 
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firms’ variable. Empirical results show that in blockholder-dominated companies CEO 
turnover is as sensitive to stock market and accounting performance as in non-family firms 
with dispersed ownership, whereas the performance-turnover sensitivity in family controlled 
firms is considerably lower. The coefficients for blockholder-dominated firms are positive 
although insignificant for both stock returns and accounting performance, meaning that there 
are no differences with non-family firms with dispersed ownership, which report coefficient 
of -1.39 and margin of -0.26 for negative industry-adjusted market return, and coefficient of -
3.75 and margin of -0.70 (both significant at 5%) for negative industry-adjusted ROA.  
I propose that the lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in family firms, than in firms 
with dominant blockholders, is due to familial relations between the CEO and the controlling 
owners since family firms and blockholder-dominated firms have, on average, the same 
ownership concentration. This represents an important new insight for the corporate 
governance literature, demonstrating that concentrated ownership, like for family firms and 
for blockholder-dominated companies, enhance the monitoring activity on the board of 
directors and on the CEO. As a consequence, the higher is the monitoring the higher is the 
turnover-performance sensitivity and thus the corporate governance quality. Notwithstanding, 
the familial relations weaken the positive contribution of concentrated ownership because I 
report (given an equal level of ownership concentration on average) a weaker CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity in family firms as compared to non-family firms dominated by a 
blockholder. 
Furthermore, I show that blockholder-dominated firms and non-family firms with dispersed 
ownership put weight on both measures of performance. These findings give support of my 
thesis about the importance of monitoring in putting more weight on one measure of 
performance instead of another, and they underline once again that the differences between 
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family and non-family firms are not due to the ownership concentration, but rather are due to 
the family firms’ characteristics and familial relations. Family owners are not well diversified 
investors, thus their personal wealth is highly related to the success of the firm. As a 
consequence they behave like an active shareholder (active monitor). On the contrary, the 
blockholder hold a well-diversified portfolio, thus it may be possible that he behave as a 
passive shareholder (passive monitor). Usually, the family just holds one company 
(undiversified risk), while the blockholder (Pension funds, Common Funds, Institutional 
Investors, etc.) generally invest in more than one business, being more diversified. This does 
not allow the blockholder to actively monitor the firm even if he has the power to do it. Thus, 
this explains why he needs to both measures of performance: market and accounting. 
The second sensitivity test is in order to understand who replace a fired CEO from a family 
owned company. The idea is to understand whether a family CEO fired for poor performance 
is more or less likely to be replaced by a non-family member, than if a non-family CEO gets 
similarly terminated. I aim to understand the underlying reasons that induce a family firm to 
replace a family CEO or to replace a professional CEO. 
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Table 7 reports the results for this analysis. In the specific case, the dependent variable is new 
family CEO dummy which is equal to 1 when the new CEO is a family member and equal to 
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0 elsewhere. As usual, I report the positive and negative stock market returns and ROA. 
Moreover, I interact these performance measures with the dummies old family CEO (equal to 
1 when the dismissed CEO is a family member and equal to 0 elsewhere) and old 
professional CEO (equal to 1 when the dismissed CEO is not a family member and equal to 0 
elsewhere) in order to get the specific effect of the old CEO’s characteristics and 
performance on the probability that the new CEO is a family member. 
Results in table 7 show that usually a family firm replaces a family CEO with another family 
CEO (consequently, family firms use to replace professional COEs with other professional 
CEOs). Nevertheless, results for performance-induced turnovers are different. In fact, the 
likelihood that the new CEO is a family member is lower if the replaced family CEO reports 
bad accounting performance (being the coefficient of the interaction between old family CEO 
dummy and negative ROA positive and significant at 5% level). Thus, for cases of bad 
accounting returns, I posit that the family may feel to need the assistance of a professional 
manager, and the family CEO will be replaced by a non-family member CEO.  
On the other hand, table 7 reports evidence that when the replaced CEO is not a family 
member (i.e. he is a professional manager) and he reports low stock market performance, the 
probability that the new CEO is a family member increases (being the coefficient of the 
interaction between old professional CEO dummy and negative market returns negative and 
significant at 5% level). My interpretation of this finding is that in such situations the family 
may feel threatened by potential takeovers (given the bad market performance) and may 
decide to appoint a family member in order to prevent any corporate raiders.  
These findings are completely novel and relevant, and they contribute to the understanding of 
the corporate governance literature of family firms. 
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1.5. Conclusion 
A number of previous studies have documented a negative relation between chief executive 
officers (CEO) turnover and firm performance, predicting that when firm performance 
decreases, CEOs are replaced because they were not able to increase firm’s value. In this 
work, I empirically study how family ownership and familial relations directly affect the 
turnover-performance sensitivity. Of interest to this particular study is how the CEO turnover 
process works in family controlled companies, which performance measure counts more and 
what are the underlying differences between family and non-family firms (both public held 
non-family firms and blockholder-dominated companies). 
I demonstrate that family owned companies rely more on the accounting performance than 
market performance in evaluating CEOs (both family CEO and professional CEO). This is 
driven by the knowledge of the firm possessed by dominant family and the monitoring which 
is much greater than expected from the shareholders of widely held firms (given their free-
rider problem as stated by Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), making the accounting performance 
measure less noisy as compared to the same measure for non-family firms. For these same 
reasons, non-family firms put more weight on the market measure of performance. 
Additionally, I showed that the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for family 
CEOs as compared with non-family CEOs because of the entrenchment and familial relations 
(i.e. collusion).  I use blockholder-dominated companies in order to find further evidence 
about the difference between family firms and non-family firms in the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity, finding that for blockholder-dominated companies there is an inverse 
relation between the likelihood of CEO turnover and negative firm performance, observable 
for both stock returns and accounting performance (as for the non-family firms with over-
dispersion of shares) whereas, as expected, family firms rely just on the accounting 
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performance. 
Finally, for the first time in the literature, this work provides evidence about the directional 
change of CEO turnover. Results show that family firms with family CEO are more willing 
to replace the family CEO with another family CEO. However, when the firm reports a 
negative accounting performance, the probability that the new CEO is another family 
member decreases. On the other hand, family firms with professional CEOs are more willing 
to replace professional CEOs with another professional CEO. Notwithstanding, when the 
firm reports a negative market performance, the probability that the new CEO is a family 
member increases.  
This work makes several contributions to the literature on turnover-performance relation. 
First, I outline the importance and the impact of family control on the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. I shed lights on the relative importance of the different performance 
measures used in evaluating a CEO in family and non-family firms. In fact, I find that non-
family firms put more weight on stock market returns than accounting performance, while 
family firms just rely on the accounting performance. I interpret these findings as proof that 
better monitoring by family firms matter when evaluating a CEO. Non-family firms 
(especially the one with dispersed ownership) do not have such monitoring power, thus their 
shareholders have to consider more the market return, that in this case appears more accurate 
than accounting performance, in evaluating CEOs (when the monitoring is low the 
accounting measures of performance is a weaker performance signal). On the other hand, 
family firms rely on the accounting performance because it is more accurate in evaluating 
poor performing CEO. In fact, the family is more focused on the accounting performance, 
being the source of its main gain (i.e. the dividends).  
Secondly, I show that, in the family firms’ sample, the professional CEOs are the ones that 
 83 
drive the results, because family related CEOs are not replaced for poor performance. This 
finding underlines the high benefits of control that lead to entrenchment. Furthermore, it is 
critical for the understanding of the corporate governance mechanisms of family firms and, 
also, it could be a clue for future research that aims to study the market reaction to such 
behavior.  
Thirdly, the tests for blockholder-dominated firms show how they put weight on both 
measures of performance providing support for my view of the importance of monitoring in 
determining the relative weights put on the measures of performance. It also serves to show 
once again that the differences between family and non-family firms are not due to the 
ownership concentration, but rather are due to the family firms’ characteristics and familial 
relations.  
Finally, I show that family firms decide to replace a family CEO with a professional CEO 
just when they need professional assistance (i.e. in cases of bad accounting performance). 
Instead, family firms replace a professional CEO with a family CEO in cases of low stock 
market returns, hence when the family feels threatened by potential takeovers and decide to 
appoint a family member in order to prevent any corporate raiders. 
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CHAPTER 3: Family Ownership, Earnings Management, and CEO Turnover. 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
In this study, I investigate the effect of ownership structure on the threat of Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) dismissal. Using the unique ownership characteristics of the Italian setting, I 
examine the association between earnings management and performance induced CEO 
turnovers in family and non-family controlled public firms. In doing so, I use the differences 
in ownership structures to gauge the sensitivity of the relation. Providing insight into the 
environment of family-owned firms, which are the dominant form of ownership in the 
corporate world (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000).  
Previous studies document the numerous costs imposed by earnings management on the 
firm’s shareholders (see, e.g., Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 2012; Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki 2003). Leuz et al., (2003), point to the transparency costs associated with managers 
masking the true economic conditions of the firm through earnings management. Given this 
view, earnings management can be thought of as being primarily driven by an agency 
problem, managers trying to extract private rents to the detriment of shareholders. As a result, 
the firm’s corporate governance system is structured to minimize the managerial incentive to 
engage in earnings management. For example, the firm’s board may structure the CEO’s 
compensation to be less sensitive to opportunistic behaviors or it may dismiss CEOs that 
behave opportunistically.  
Using an agency framework to motivate their study, Hazarika et al., (2012), find a positive 
association between earnings management and CEO turnover, concluding that governance 
increases the manager’s marginal cost of engaging in earnings management. I aim to examine 
the nature of this relation in the context of family-controlled firms in which the agency 
problem is mitigated by family ownership concentration and family ties. This issue is 
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relevant because in family controlled and managed firms, the CEO being a member of the 
family, the incentives of the CEO and controlling family are closely aligned by family ties. In 
this case, earnings management may be utilized to extract benefits for both the CEO and 
controlling family. Using this view, I study whether the sensitivity of the governance 
mechanism used to punish earnings management is executed equally amongst firms with 
different ownership structures. Specifically, I predict that characteristics of family firms 
moderate the positive association between CEO turnover and earnings management that may 
be found in widely held public firms.  
 Results of the empirical analysis indicate that earnings management, measured as the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, is positively related with the probability of CEO 
dismissal in the full sample. Given earnings management, I find a 1.77% marginal increase in 
the likelihood of turnover consistent with the costly nature of earnings management to the 
firm’s shareholders. When I examine the relation in family-controlled firms, I find an 
incremental negative relation between earnings management and CEO turnover. This -1.53% 
marginal decrease in the likelihood of turnover, when netted against the unconditional effect, 
results in a lower earnings management-CEO turnover sensitivity in family-controlled firms. 
Finally, when I look at family-controlled and managed firms, in which the CEO is a family 
member, the positive relation between earnings management and CEO turnover is further 
reduced. This result supports the lower principal-agent problem in family firms, as would be 
predicted, when family ties align the incentives of the CEO and controlling family.  
I examine the sensitivity of the results for cases in which earnings management could be 
more or less costly, e.g., the magnitude of the earnings management is extremely high or low. 
I find that baseline results are strengthened when high levels of absolute discretionary 
accruals are used rather than low levels of absolute discretionary accruals. This is consistent 
with high levels of absolute discretionary accruals being costlier to shareholders, such as 
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financial restatements and transparency costs. As a result, I observe a significant and positive 
relation between CEO turnover and high levels of absolute discretionary accruals. On the 
other hand, low levels of absolute discretionary accruals are not significantly related to CEO 
turnover, consistent with them being less costly to shareholders and, in some cases, even 
providing benefits to the firm in meeting or beating analysts’ forecast or in smoothing 
earnings. As expected, with regard to family controlled firms, the positive and significant 
relation between high levels of absolute discretionary accruals and CEO turnover is absent.   
I conduct an array of robustness tests to rule out alternative explanations. I examine whether 
differences in the propensity of family and non-family firms to engage in earnings 
management are driving my results.  I find that there is no significant difference in the levels 
of total and discretionary accruals between family and non-family firms. I go on to study 
whether ownership concentration as opposed to family ownership, drive my results. Looking 
at the effect of non-family dominant shareholders (i.e. blockholder-dominated firms) on the 
relation between earnings management and CEO turnover, finding that ownership 
concentration alone does not explain baseline results.   
This study contributes to the literature by examining the diversity in corporate governance 
systems as well as providing insights into the understudied yet prominent ownership structure 
of family firms. By investigating variations in the sensitivity of the earnings management-
CEO turnover relation, I demonstrate that differences in ownership structure, as well as 
differences in the magnitude of the agency problems associated with them, lead to different 
corporate governance systems. This distinction is crucial when interpreting many of the 
findings in the corporate governance literature, given that some results may not be 
generalizable to all settings. I demonstrate that corporate governance is not invariant, but 
rather conditional on the specific context of the firm. I use family firms and the mitigation of 
the agency problem associated with these firms to stress the differences in corporate 
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governance systems. I shed light on the environment of family-owned firms, which are the 
dominant ownership form in the corporate world. La Porta et al. (2000) document that 
families control over 53% of publicly traded firms with at least 500 million of capitalization 
in 27 countries. Yet, despite the prevalence of the ownership structure, family firms have 
received scant attention in previous research on corporate governance. Finally, I speak to the 
relative costs of earnings management to shareholders under an agency framework, using the 
sensitivity of the CEO turnover-earnings management relation as a measure of the 
importance of the costs of earnings management to shareholders.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background and 
develops my two hypotheses. Section 3 covers the research design and describes the 
empirical model used to investigate the hypotheses. Results and sensitivity tests are discussed 
in Section 4. Finally, in section 5 I conclude. 
  
1.2. Earnings management and forced CEO turnovers 
 
The literature on earnings management focuses extensively on the expected costs that 
earnings management imposes on shareholders. Haley and Wahlen (1999) define earnings 
management as the alteration of a firm’s reported economic performance by insiders to either 
mislead stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes. Along this line, much of the past 
research examines manager’s expected private benefits from engaging in earnings 
management (see, e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Chung 2002; Frankel, Johnson, and 
Nelson 2002; Hazarika et al. 2012; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Leuz et al. 2003; Mergenthaler, 
Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2012).  
I argue, and many previous studies show, that the managerial incentive to misrepresent firm’s 
financial performance through earnings management arises, in part, from the conflict of 
interest between the firm’s managers and shareholders and the information asymmetry 
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associated with this separation. Managers use their informational advantage and discretion to 
manage earnings to bolster their compensation, increase the gains in the sales of shares, 
increase job security and obtain operational flexibility or control (see, e.g., Ahmed et al. 
2006; Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Cornett et al. 2008; DeFond and Park, 1997; Efendi et al. 2007; Safdar 2003). Implicitly 
assumed in the arguments put forward in these studies is the notion that managers face some 
costs in their manipulation. If not, there would be no end to the manipulation. Desai et al. 
(2006), examine the adverse reputational penalties to managers that result from the 
announcement of an earnings restatement. They find that 60% of restating firms experience a 
turnover in at least one top manager within 24 months of the restatement compared to only 
35% among age-, size- and industry-matched firms. These results coincide with those of 
Agrawal et al., (1999) and Beneish, (1999). The private rents that managers extract through 
earnings management come at a significant cost to the firm and its shareholders, under the 
form of earnings restatements or sanctions by regulators, to name a few (see, e.g., Agrawal 
and Cooper 2008; Desai et al. 2006; Karpoff et al. 2008). The firm’s corporate governance 
system serves as a mechanism to increase the manager’s marginal cost of partaking in these 
opportunistic activities. 
Given that earnings management generally arises out of an agency problem, a number of 
studies examine the role that a firm’s corporate governance system has on the manager’s 
propensity to manage earnings. I examine the effects of governance mechanisms on earnings 
management by focusing on CEO turnover, given that the threat of dismissal is one of the 
most significant costs a manager may face in the firm (see Hazarika et al. 2012).  
Studies on CEO turnover usually focus on the relation between firm’s financial performance 
and CEO turnover. The literature points to a significant negative association between forced 
turnovers and firm performance; the likelihood of CEO dismissal increases as the firm’s 
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financial performance deteriorates, be it return on assets (ROA) or stock performance 
(Kaplan and Minton 2012; Kothari et al. 2006; Murphy 1999). In regards to the relation 
between earnings management and CEO turnover, Hazarika et al. (2012) examine the relation 
in the context of widely-held U.S. firms. They find that the likelihood and speed of CEO 
turnover is positively related to earnings management (both downwards and upwards). 
Specifically, they find that earnings management increases the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnovers in subsequent years while having no effect on voluntary CEO turnovers. They 
claim that the internal governance of the firm works to discipline earnings management 
incentives before they become severe enough to attract public attention. This interpretation is 
consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), who argue that earnings management imposes costs on 
shareholders, specifically transparency costs. As a result, the threat of CEO dismissal is 
sensitive to the amount of earnings management.  
I take the opportunity to expand on the issue of corporate governance and earnings 
management using family firms, in which the traditional type I agency problem has been 
shown to be mitigated (see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Ronald et al. 2003, 2004; Van den 
Berghe and Carchon 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006). In family firms, the family generally 
controls a large stake in the firm and acts as a large shareholder mitigating the agency 
problem. As a consequence, the family has both a general interest in profit maximization and 
enough control over the assets to have their interest respected. The family is more likely to 
have stronger incentives to monitor managers, who for the most part are members of the 
family itself. In this regard, the family is actively involved in the firm’s management and has 
a thorough understanding of the business, with the family tending to have longer investment 
horizons. Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006), for example, find that family firms adopt 
substantially different corporate governance structures as a result of their ownership.  
In family controlled firms, the influence of family ties may help mitigate the incentive to 
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misrepresent firm performance through earnings management, which usually arises from a 
conflict of interest between the firm’s insiders (managers) and outsiders (shareholders in 
general). I believe that the level of earnings management in family firms may not differ from 
widely-held firms, given that the dominant family may still allow managers to engage in 
earnings management in order to reduce dividends to minority shareholders, as shown in 
Wang (2006), or in order to increase family members’ compensation and bonuses (when the 
CEO is a member of the family). Given that the dominant family directly controls the firm, 
any earnings management is done with the consent of the family itself and, as such, I expect 
that the relation between CEO turnover and earnings management to differ from the case of 
widely-held firms. 
Overall, given the same level of earnings management, the reduction of the agency problem 
in family controlled firms should be reflected in a weaker relation between earnings 
management and CEO turnover in family-controlled companies as compared to non-family 
firms. Moreover, I expect an even lower sensitivity, with respect to the relation between 
earnings management and CEO turnover, when the family also manages the firm, i.e., the 
CEO is a member of the dominant family. 
 
1.3. Data and research design 
 
Sample 
Given the focus on family ownership’s effect on the CEO turnover-earnings management 
relation, I utilize a hand-collected sample of Italian firms to conduct the study. I rely on the 
Italian setting given the high propensity of family ownership in this country, which allows me 
to increase the power of my tests in determining the effects of family ownership on the CEO 
turnover-earnings management relation. Additionally, previous studies have also relied on the 
uniqueness of the Italian context to examine family business characteristics (see, e.g., 
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Corbetta and Montemerlo 1999; Corbetta and Tomaselli 1996; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; 
Mengoli et al. 2009; Perrini et al. 2008; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef 2011). I begin constructing 
my sample by identifying all listed companies on the Italian Stock Exchanges during the 
period of 2006 to 2010. From this group I exclude financial firms, as well as bank holding 
companies, given the different nature of their accruals and the regulatory environment in 
which they operate. Thus, I are left with 221 non-financial Italian firms listed during the 
period of 2006-2010. This sample will be further reduced during tests, given the data 
requirements discussed below. The remainder of this section discusses the variables of 
interest and control covariates, as well as the empirical specifications used to test the 
hypotheses. 
 
CEO Turnover 
I construct my measure of CEO turnover at the firm level by identifying CEOs for all firms 
listed on the Italian Stock Exchanges between 2006-2010. I utilize the annual firm filings 
with CONSOB (the Italian Securities and Exchanges regulator), two Italian stock exchange 
yearbooks (Calepino dell’Azionista and the Taccuino dell’Azionista), as well as information 
from the Borsa Italiana to identify the years in which there was a CEO change at the 
company. I define the turnover variable as a dummy equal to one in the year in which the 
CEO changes. 
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Given the lack of information on the causes of turnover from public sources, I conduct news 
searches to eliminate turnovers due to death and retirements, turnovers that were not linked to 
performance, which may introduce noise in the analysis, reducing the sample of turnovers to 
122. I do not consider situations in which the CEOs leave voluntarily for other opportunities 
(i.e. volunteer turnovers). Consequently, the turnovers considered are solely forced turnovers. 
Table 1, Panel A summarizes the turnover sample of 122 turnovers during the sample period 
by year. The non-turnover sample of firms includes all remaining non-financial listed Italian 
firms during the time period. This yields a total sample of 221 firms corresponding to 1035 
firm-year observations. 
 
Earnings Management 
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I measure earnings management as the absolute value of abnormal accruals, using the 
performance-adjusted discretionary accrual model of Kothari et al. (2005).10 In estimating the 
Jones model, I follow previous literature (Jones 1991) and use non-cash working capital 
accruals (TA) as measure of total accruals, where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = (ΔCA𝑖,𝑡 − ΔCL𝑖,𝑡 − ΔCash𝑖,𝑡 + ΔSTD𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡)/𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
and 
ΔCA𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
ΔCA𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
ΔCash𝑖,𝑡 =   𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  
ΔSTD𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡  
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡  =  Total Assets. 
I estimate discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual model 
pooling all firm-year observations cross-sectionally and running the model by industry taking 
the absolute value of the residual from the model as measure of discretionary accruals:11 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 �1 𝐴� 𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛽2�Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡� + 𝛽3�𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡� + 𝛽4�𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where: 
Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 PPEi,t = Net Property Plant and Equipment scaled by lagged total assets  ROA𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖′𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 − 1. 
The use of lagged total assets, as a scaler, is consistent with prior literature (see, Dechow et 
al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005) and mitigates any heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
                                                        
10Results are not sensitive to this particular measure of discretionary accruals. I obtain similar results using 
discretionary accruals from the Jones (1991) model as well as the Dechow-Dichev Model (2002). 
11 I note that in cases where the number of firms in an industry is less than 10 estimates of the coefficients to run 
the performance-adjusted Jones Model. 
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Additionally, I include a constant in the model to further reduce heteroskedasticity and 
increase the power of the tests as recommended by Kothari et al. (2005). I include the firm’s 
lagged ROA to control for the correlation between accruals and the performance of a firm. 
The data used to estimate the two equations above come from the Thompson Reuters 
Worldscope database. I exclude firm-year observations where there are insufficient data to 
estimate the Jones model. Additionally, I winsorize extreme values of TA when running the 
performance augmented Jones model at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of 
outliers.12 
Following Cohen et al. (2008), Hazarika et al. (2012), Klein (2002), and others, I define 
earnings management as the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The use of the absolute 
value reflects the fact that managers can utilize discretionary accruals to either increase or 
decrease reported earnings. Managers have an incentive to manage earnings up to increase 
bonuses and stock compensation (Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007). On the other hand, 
managers also have an incentive to manage earnings downward, before the reissue of stock 
options (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998) or before share repurchases (Gong, Louis, and Sun 
2008). Additionally, managers can use negative accruals strategically to shift income between 
time periods or by the controlling family to extract rents from minority shareholders. By 
using the absolute value of discretionary accruals, I capture managers’ attempts to both 
manage earnings up or down. 
 
Firm Family Ownership Control and Firm Governance Measures 
In order to examine the effects of family ownership on the earnings management-CEO 
turnover relation, I construct a variable to empirically measure the percentage of ownership 
(control) by the family at the firm level. In constructing the measure, I adopt a family                                                         
12 Results are robust to winsorizing at less extreme percentiles and truncation (untabulated). 
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ownership classification scheme similar to the one implemented by Minichilli et al. (2010) 
and Prencipe and Bar-Yosef (2011) where family-controlled companies are identified as 
firms in which the dominant family has some concrete form of controlling power. More 
specifically, I classified a listed company as having family ownership when the dominant 
family holds the highest percentage of the voting rights when compared to all other relevant 
shareholders listed by CONSOB, usually more than 30% of voting rights. 13 In order to 
determine family ownership, I examined the firms CONSOB filings and the two stock market 
yearbooks for the period 2006-2010. I operationalize the definition of family control by a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of 1, if a dominant family directly controls the firm or 
else 0. My sample contains roughly 60% family-controlled firms, which is in line with the 
59% found in the Faccio and Lang (2002) study. Also, I use this variable to partition the 
sample.  
When I partition the sample based on family ownership, I have 83 CEO turnovers in family-
controlled firms while non-family firms have 50 turnovers. Furthermore, in table 2, in which 
I provide descriptive statistics on the sample, I see average family ownership concentration of 
38% in the sample, but the percentage is as high as 97% for some family-owned firms.  
I hand collect measures of the firms’ corporate governance to include in the regressions given 
the association to turnover found in the previous literature. Specifically, I obtain information 
on whether the CEO is a member of the controlling family (CEO Member of the Family), 
whether the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors (CEO Duality), and the CEO’s 
age. Finally, I obtain a measure of board member independence by taking the percentage of 
independent board members for each of the firms in the sample.  
 
Firm Financial Performance and Other Firm Characteristics                                                         
13 CONSOB is the Italian SEC equivalent and discloses the list of all relevant shareholders for publicly traded 
Italian companies. 
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In the multivariate test, I control for several firm characteristics that may influence the extent 
to which managers may manage their firms’ accruals and the probability they may be fired. 
By doing this, I isolate the impact of absolute discretionary accruals on CEO turnover. 
To measure firm performance, I examine the industry adjusted stock returns, the industry 
returns as a whole, operating performance, and sales growth.14 The industry adjusted stock 
return (Return) is calculated as the 4-quarter average return for the year prior to the CEO 
turnover minus the contemporaneous industry return based on DataStream industry level 6 
identifiers. I also include the 4-quarter average return for the industry (Industry Return) in the 
regressions to capture any industry-wide performance that might affect the inferences. 
Operating performance is measured as operating income before depreciation and 
amortization divided by the book value of total assets. Sales growth is measured as the 
percentage change in revenues over the prior year. I also include operating income in the 
multivariate test to control for firm performance. 
Additionally, I control for other firm characteristics in my tests by including additional 
covariates. To control for firm growth opportunities, I use the market to book ratio, defined 
as the sum of the book value of debt plus market value of equity divided by the firms’ total 
assets. I control for the financial structure of the firm and the effect of debt by including the 
leverage of the firm, defined as the total book value of debt divided by the sum of the book 
value of debt and market value of equity. Finally, I control for the size of the firm by 
including the natural log of total assets in my tests. All of the accounting and financial 
variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to reduce the effects of outliers. 
Table 2 presents the general summary statistics for the variables of interest for the full sample 
(Panel A), as well as for the sub sample of CEO Turnover (Panel B), and no-CEO turnover 
                                                        
14  All of the financial and accounting variables are obtained from Thompson Reuters DataStream and 
Worldscope databases and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the effects of outliers. 
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sample (Panel C). The table displays the difference in the level of absolute discretionary 
accruals in panels B and C, where the average absolute discretionary accrual, 0.05 in the 
CEO turnover sample, is greater than the 0.03 of the non-turnover one. 
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The Empirical Specification 
To study the relation between earnings management and CEO turnover, the following probit 
regression is run over the full sample of firms with the necessary data requirements and is 
structured as follows: 
CEO Turnover i,t = αi + β1(AbsDisc i,t – 1) + β2(Return i,t – 1) + β3(Ind_Return i,t – 1)  
+ β4(Sales_Growth i,t – 1) + β5(Market_to_Book i,t – 1) + β6(Operating_Performance i,t – 1)  
+ β7(LogTA i,t – 1) + β8(CEOagei,t – 1) + β9(Leveragei,t – 1) + β10(Operating_Income i,t – 1)  
+ β11(Perc_Independent_directors i,t – 1) +ε i,t  
I examine the hypothesis by running the previous specification with the addition of a family 
firm indicator and its interaction with my earnings management variable, using the magnitude 
and significance of this variable to test for the effect of family control on earnings 
management.  
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑖,𝑡−1)+ 𝛽4(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1)+ 𝛽6(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽8(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1)+ 𝛽9(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽10(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1)+ 𝛽11(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽12(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)+ 𝛽13(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
I report the coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis, and the average marginal effects in 
brackets for each variable in the multivariate test to facilitate with the interpretation of the 
results. 
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1.4. Results 
 
Drawing on the previous literature on earnings management and CEO turnover, I examine the 
baseline model of CEO turnover and earnings management irrespective of the ownership 
structure. 
 
 
The correlation matrix (Table 3) provides preliminary evidence on the relation. In terms of 
CEO turnover and earnings management, I find that absolute discretionary accruals are 
significant and positively correlated with CEO turnover with a correlation of 0.15. Consistent 
with previous findings, I find that performance is negatively and significantly correlated with 
CEO turnover with a correlation of -0.11. 
 107 
 
 
Table 4 displays the main results of the analysis. In Model 1, I regress the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals on CEO turnover and I find a significant positive relation. Model 2 
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examines whether CEOs are dismissed given their previous financial performance (measured 
as the industry-adjusted market return). I obtain results consistent with previous literature, 
finding a negative and significant relation between CEO turnover and market returns (see, 
e.g., Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda 2012; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993). Specifically, a one-
percent decrease in the firm’s industry-adjusted market return leads to an average 0.27% 
marginal increase in the probability of CEO dismissal. Also consistent with previous 
findings, I find the market to book ratio, which controls for potential growth opportunities is 
positively and significantly related to CEO turnover, with an average marginal effect of 
0.19%. Finally, I control for board independence using the percentage of independent 
directors and find a positive and significant relation to CEO dismissal. This relation is 
consistent with previous works that have shown the effectiveness of independent boards in 
terms of governance (Hermalin and Weisbach 2001).  
In Model 3, I add the control variables employed in previous studies, from Model 2, to the 
earnings management measure combing Models 1 and 2. I find that the coefficient of 
absolute discretionary accruals remains positive and significant after the addition of the 
covariates. Specifically, I find that an increase in absolute discretionary accruals of one 
percent leads to a marginal increase of 1.77% in the probability of CEO dismissal. The 
market performance, market to book ratio and percentage of independent directors continue 
to be positively and significantly associated with CEO turnover. Overall, results from Model 
3 support the findings of previous studies that after controlling for performance, an increase 
in the level of earnings management is associated with a higher likelihood of CEO turnover. 
These results confirm the notion that earnings management arises out of an agency problem 
between managers and owners, as suggested by Clikeman (2003) and Leuz, et al. (2003) and, 
as such, the firm uses the threat of dismissal to constrain the agency problem. Findings are 
also consistent with those of Hazarika et al. (2012), who find that the likelihood and speed of 
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CEO turnover is positively related to the firms’ earnings management (both downwards and 
upwards). Additionally, Models 1, 2 and 3 serve to give external validity of my Italian 
sample, in which I observe results similar to those found in the U.S. context when I examine 
the full cross section. 
In Models 4 and 5, I examine how family ownership and management affect the positive and 
significant relation between absolute discretionary accruals and CEO turnover. Model 4 
indicates that in family-dominated firms, where the typical agency conflict between managers 
and owners is mitigated by family ownership concentration and monitoring, the relation is 
weaker than the one observed in non-family firms. Empirical results allow me to reject the 
null hypothesis of no difference between family and non-family firms, with the coefficient of 
the interaction of the family control dummy and earnings management variable (-9.65) being 
negative and significant at the 5% level. In terms of economic significance, in family-
controlled firms the average marginal effect of earnings management on the likelihood of 
CEO turnover is 1.50% less than in widely-held public firms. This negative relation is in line 
with the view that in family-controlled firms, the agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders is reduced by family ownership, and the likelihood of the CEO being dismissed 
is lower, even when I observe earnings management.  
These results support the conjecture that CEOs in family firms tend to collude with the 
dominant family in managing earnings. This explains why the coefficient on the interaction 
of the family dummy and earnings management is negative and three-fourth the size of the 
coefficient on the non-family firms earnings management estimate, with an (untabulated) F-
test rejecting the null that the two coefficients are the same. Thus, family ownership mitigates 
the positive relation between CEO turnover and earnings management observed in Table 4 as 
well as in Hazarika et al. (2012).  
Finally, I examine variations in the alignment of incentives between managers and 
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shareholders may lead to a differential in the likelihood of the CEO dismissal in family firms. 
In particular, I examine differences between cases in which the CEO is a family member and 
cases in which a non-family professional manager is the CEO. If the family firm’s attributes 
drive my notion of lower agency conflict, then family controlled and managed firms should 
experience less sensitivity with respect to the likelihood of turnover given earnings 
management when compared to family controlled firms with professional CEOs. The 
difference being driven by family ties between the controlling family and family member 
CEO further aligning interests and lowering the agency problem. 
Model 5 of Table 4 indicates that while the relation between earnings management and CEO 
turnover continues to be relevant (coefficients are significant at the 1% and 0.1% level), the 
interaction between family firms, CEO member of the family, and earnings management is 
negative and significant with a coefficient of -10.05. This negative and significant relation 
with CEO turnover shows the collusion between the dominant family and the family CEO in 
cases of earnings management and, as a consequence, I observe a net zero probability of 
getting dismissed for family CEOs who may engage in earnings management. Additionally, 
the residual significance in the CEO turnover-earnings management relation observed in 
family-controlled firms, found in Model 4, can be explained by the presence of non-family 
professional CEOs in which case the incentives are not as aligned as for family CEOs, and I 
observe a significant weight on earnings management as a result. This finding strengthens the 
view that lower agency conflict in family controlled and managed firms reduces the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal. Overall, results are in line with previous literature that argues 
that family and non-family-controlled companies have different corporate governance 
systems, driven by the differences in the agency problem, thereby, confirming the moderating 
effect of family ownership on the relation between CEO turnover and earnings management 
(see, e.g., Brunello, Graziano, and Parigi 2003; Claessence et al. 2000; DeAngelo and 
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DeAngelo 2000; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck et al. 2000). 
 
Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
The findings in Table 4 support the view that the relation between CEO turnover and 
earnings management is less sensitive in family-controlled firms, and even less sensitive in 
family controlled and managed firms. However, there are several alternative explanations that 
could also explain my findings. In this section, I examine the sensitivity and robustness of the 
results to these alternative explanations.  
Given the claim that the cost of earnings management on shareholders drives the positive 
relation observed between earnings management and CEO turnover, I increase the power of 
my tests by examining the sensitivity of the relation in cases of extremely high levels of 
earnings management, as well as in cases of extremely low levels of earnings management. I 
partition the sample based on the level of absolute discretionary accruals, assuming that 
extremely high levels of absolute discretionary accruals (values of absolute discretionary 
accrual from the top quartile) are more costly to the firm than extremely low values of 
absolute discretionary accruals. This reasoning stems from the notion that extremely high 
levels of absolute discretionary accruals should be correlated with private rent extraction on 
the part of the CEO, i.e., efforts to maximize bonuses or share repurchases. Whereas, 
extremely low values of discretionary accruals could reflect efforts to meet or beat analyst 
expectations, which would provide benefits to the overall firm. Hence, if the cost of earnings 
management is the primary driver for the positive relation observed in Table 4, I should 
observe a higher sensitivity in the relation for the high levels of absolute discretionary 
accruals as compared to that of low absolute discretionary accruals.  
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In Table 5, I replicate the analysis of Table 415, but I replace discretionary accruals with high 
values of absolute discretionary accruals or low values of absolute discretionary accruals. I 
observe that the coefficient of earnings management is significant for high absolute 
discretionary accruals, while the relation is statistically insignificant for low absolute                                                         
15 I omit the coefficients for the control variables for brevity, but the estimation of the models included previous 
control variables. 
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discretionary accruals (Table 5, Model 1, and 2). When I examine the family-controlled firms 
(Model 3, and 4), the two cases are statistically insignificant, again consistent with previous 
findings in Model 4 and 5 of Table 4. Hence, these results further support the view that the 
costly levels of earnings management (i.e. those observed in cases of high values of 
discretionary accruals) are associated with a higher probability of CEO turnover in non-
family firms. While in family controlled firms this relation is absent, given the reduction of 
the agency problem, even for high values of discretionary accruals. 
The differential in the sensitivity of earnings management and CEO turnover relation 
between family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms observed in Table 4, could also 
arise from differences in the propensity of family and non-family firms to manage earnings. 
Thus, it could be that the propensity to manage earnings is lower in family firms when 
compared to the non-family-controlled firms, and this may affect the relation hereby studied. 
To test this alternative explanation, I examine the average level of various measures of 
accruals between family and non-family firms. In Table 6, I show the significance of the 
mean differences between the two classes of firms. 
The results in Table 6 show that both family and non-family firms equally manage earnings. 
The two variables measuring earnings management (total accruals and discretionary accruals) 
are not statistically different, as T-tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference in 
the means. Thus, I can rule out the notion that differences in propensity to manage earnings 
drive my results. Hence, the lower CEO turnover-earnings management sensitivity of family 
owned firms is due to family ownership and its corporate governance. 
Finally, I examine whether the differences between family and non-family firms observed in 
Table 4 are simply driven by ownership concentration and the associated monitoring, rather 
than by the unique characteristics of the family-controlled firms’ corporate governance 
system. To test this alternative explanation, I include an indicator variable for blockholder-
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dominated firms and interact this variable with the earnings management variable in the 
model. I define a blockholder-dominated firm as a firm in which there is an institutional 
investor that is not a family and has direct control of the firm16. While I find that the level of 
ownership concentration is comparable between blockholders and family owners, which 
should lead to similar monitoring levels, results in Table 7 point to differential effects 
between the two. Specifically, Table 7 reports that, in blockholder-dominated firms the 
likelihood of the CEO being dismissed after managing earnings is not significantly different 
from that of widely-held public companies, with a statistically insignificant coefficient of 
4.94 on the blockholder-earnings management interaction. 
                                                        
16 Data from CONSOB. 
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This result can be reconciled by the differences in the characteristics of the monitors because 
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dominant families act as active monitors, whereas non-family blockholders may take a 
passive role and, as a result, they are no different than widely-held public firms. Hence, 
ownership concentration alone does not explain my preliminary results. 
While results and robustness tests point to the mitigating effect of family ownership and 
control on the CEO turnover-earnings management relation, this study is subject to 
generalizability limitations. In utilizing the Italian setting given its unique family ownership 
characteristics, results are limited in that the relation between family members in the Italian 
setting differs from those observed in other countries. While this is a concern, to my 
knowledge, no empirical study has shown family ties to significantly differ between 
countries. Additionally, the positive and significant relation found in public widely-held 
companies in Italy (Table 4, Model 1, 2, and 3), is similar to findings in the U.S setting 
(Hazarika et al. 2012) giving credence to the generalizability of the results. Additionally, 
results only point to the effect of family ownership on the costs of earnings management due 
to type I agency problems, as such, I are not able to speak to other agency problems, such as 
those between majority and minority shareholders (type II), that have been shown to exist in 
family-controlled firms. 
 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the understudied topic of CEO turnover and earnings management in 
family-controlled firms. Given the prominent role of the agency problem, i.e. managers 
extracting private rents at a cost to shareholders, in driving earnings management the firm’s 
corporate governance system should be structured to minimize the incentives of mangers to 
engage in earnings management. As a result, I focus on one of the most extreme mechanisms 
boards have to discipline managers: CEO dismissal. Using the unique ownership 
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characteristics of the Italian setting, I examine the relation between earnings management and 
performance induced CEO turnovers in family and non-family controlled public firms.  
As such, I aim to examine the nature of this relation in the context of family-controlled firms 
in which the agency problem is mitigated. I predict that ownership concentration and family 
ties in family firms reduce the positive association between CEO turnover and earnings 
management found in widely held firms. Additionally, I study whether the sensitivity of the 
governance mechanism used to punish earnings management is executed equally amongst 
firms with different ownership structures.  
The results of my empirical analysis indicate that earnings management is positively related 
to the probability of CEO dismissal in the full sample. This finding is consistent with the 
costly nature of earnings management to the firm’s shareholders and the use of turnover as a 
disciplining mechanism in widely-held public firms. When I examine the relation in family-
controlled firms, i.e. when a family holds a controlling stake in the firm, I find an incremental 
negative relation between earnings management and CEO turnover, resulting in a lower CEO 
turnover sensitivity to earnings management in family controlled firms. Finally, when I look 
at family-controlled and managed firms in which a family member is the CEO, the positive 
relation between earnings management and CEO turnover is further reduced. This result 
supports the notion that earnings management imposes a lower cost to majority shareholders 
in family firms because family ties align the incentives of the CEO and controlling family.  
I go on to conduct an array of robustness tests to rule out alternative explanations for my 
results. I examine whether results are induced by differences between family and non-family 
firms in their propensity to commit earnings management, finding no significant difference 
between firms. I analyze cases in which earnings management could be more costly, i.e., 
when the magnitude is extreme, finding that my baseline results are strengthened. I move on 
to examine the monitoring story, as an alternative explanation, by looking at cases of 
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blockholder-dominated firms, finding no significant results supporting the blockholder effect.  
In this regard, my study provides insight into the understudied topic of corporate governance 
in family firms, specifically with respect to the effects of family ownership on the relation 
between CEO turnover and earnings management. I provide evidence as to two distinct 
corporate governance systems: the one found in widely-held firms, where the behavior is 
punished, and the one found in family-controlled firms, where the behavior is not punished. 
This insight is useful in explaining the corporate governance of family-owned firms, one of 
the dominant ownership forms in the corporate world. Yet, despite the prevalence of the 
ownership structure, this setting has received scant attention from previous academic research 
on corporate governance. This study provides further evidence as to the differences in 
corporate governance mechanism and the care with which current results grounded in widely 
held firms should be applied to cases of family firms. Additionally, this study tests the 
traditional predictions of agency theory in an innovative way using a setting in which the 
agency relation can be mitigated and examine how the sensitivity may change as a result. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
 Description of Variables 
 
Variable Definitions 
CEO Turnover Dummy variable equal to 1 for the years in which the CEO is 
replaced, and equal to 0 otherwise. Turnovers are classified as 
forced if the CEO was fired or forced out from the position. I 
removed cases in which turnover is volunteer, or due to retirement 
or death.  
Absolute Discretionary Accruals My measure of Earnings Management from the performance-
adjusted modified Jones (1991) model. 
Return The industry-adjusted market return calculated as the 4-quarter 
average market return the year before the CEO turnover minus the 
contemporaneous industry market return based on DataStream 
industry level 6 identifiers. 
Industry Return The 4-quarter average market return for the industry.  
Sales Growth Measured as the percentage change in revenues over the prior year.  
Market to Book The sum of the book value of debt plus market value of equity 
divided by the firm’s total assets.  
Operating Performance Operating income scaled by total assets.  
Log Total Assets The natural logarithm of total assets. 
CEO Age The age of the CEO. 
Leverage The total book value of debt divided by the book value of debt and 
market value of equity.  
Operating Income Earnings before interests and taxes.  
Family Ownership (%) The percentage of shares owned by the controlling family. 
Independent Directors (%) Calculated as the number of the independent directors on the board 
divided by the number of the board's member.  
Family Firms Dummy The dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a family-dominated 
firm, and equal to 0 otherwise.  
Family Firms*Earnings Management The interaction variable calculated as Family firms dummy times 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Family member CEO Dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if a member of the 
controlling family acts as CEO, and 0 if a Professional CEO (no 
Family member) act as CEO. 
Family member CEO*Earnings Management The interaction variable calculated as Family member CEO times 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Blockholder-Dominated Firm Dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Non-Family firm has a 
blockholder that directly control the company, and equal to 0 if the 
Non-Family firms is not dominated by any relevant blockholder.  
Blockholder Firm*Earnings Management The interaction variable calculated as Blockholder-dominated 
firms dummy times absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
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Concluding Remarks    
Even though family ownership is sometimes considered as an inefficient enterprise 
model, it represents the dominant ownership form in the world. Research on family firms is a 
relatively new stream in the business area, which has analyzed the effect of family ownership 
on a multitude of business issues. 
This dissertation aims at studying the corporate governance of family-owned firms. In 
fact, previous studies on corporate governance have mainly been based on public corporations 
with over-dispersed shares, leaving family firms apart.  
In particular, this work aims at demonstrating that family firms’ characteristics (such 
as the collusion between managers and owners, the benefit of control, the socioemotional 
wealth, and the family ownership) affect some corporate governance mechanisms, moderating 
the results found for widely held non-family firms. I aim at studying when conflicts of 
interests between majority and minority shareholders (Type II agency problems) lead to 
collusion between the dominant family and managers, and to the family’s extraction of private 
benefits. I show when and how corporate governance’s mechanisms act at preventing and/or 
punishing such opportunistic behavior. 
In this regard, every chapter of this dissertation provides several contributions to the 
literature of corporate governance of family-owned firms. Firstly, Chapter 1 speaks to the 
agency theory, giving empirical evidence that the incentive alignment role of compensation 
plans, as predicted by optimal contracting theory, is mitigated when the interests of managers 
and the main shareholder (i.e. the dominant family) are aligned, or when monitoring is high as 
is the case of family-owned firms. In fact, in Chapter 1 I demonstrate that CEO pay for 
performance sensitivity is lower in family than in non-family firms. The findings are 
motivated by the lower agency problems and easier monitoring of family-owned firms. 
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Family-controlled firms show less need to align the interest of CEO and shareholders, 
because monitoring by the dominant family is higher than the monitoring by shareholders in 
non-family firms with dispersed ownership. Moreover, when a family member acts as CEO, 
his interests are aligned with those of the dominant family by family ties. Indeed, I find that 
family CEOs are the ones with the lowest pay for performance sensitivity. Notwithstanding, 
family firms with family CEOs perform better as compared to non-family firms, thus 
confirming that CEO compensation is not an instrument of family’s benefit (rent) extraction. 
This insight is completely new and crucial in explaining how the family’s preservation of the 
benefits of control affects governance mechanisms.  
Secondly, Chapter 2 builds on previous studies that have documented a negative 
relation between CEO turnover and firm performance, predicting that when firm performance 
decreases, CEOs are replaced because they were not able to increase firm’s value. In this part 
of the dissertation, I empirically demonstrate how family ownership and familial relations 
directly affect the turnover-performance sensitivity. Of interest to this particular study is how 
the CEO turnover process works in family controlled companies, which performance measure 
counts more and what are the underlying differences between family and non-family firms 
(both widely held non-family firms and blockholder-dominated companies). In this regard, in 
Chapter 2 I make several contributions to the literature of turnover-performance relation. 
First, I outline the importance and the impact of family control on the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. I shed lights on the relative importance of the different performance 
measures used in evaluating a CEO in family and non-family firms. I find that non-family 
firms put more weight on stock market returns than accounting performance, while family 
firms just rely on the accounting performance. I interpret these findings as proof that better 
monitoring by family firms matter when evaluating a CEO. Non-family firms (especially the 
one with dispersed ownership) do not have such monitoring power, thus their shareholders 
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have to consider more the market return, that in this case appears more accurate than 
accounting performance, in evaluating CEOs (when the monitoring is low the accounting 
measures of performance is a weaker performance signal). On the other hand, family firms 
rely on the accounting performance because it is more accurate in evaluating poor performing 
CEO. In fact, the family is more focused on the accounting performance, being the source of 
its main gain (i.e. the dividends). Moreover, I show that, in the family firms’ sample, the 
professional CEOs are the ones that drive the results, because family related CEOs are not 
replaced for poor performance. This finding underlines the high benefits of control that lead 
to entrenchment. Furthermore, it is critical for the understanding of the corporate governance 
mechanisms of family firms and, also, it could be a clue for future research that aims to study 
the market reaction to such behavior. Additionally, the tests for blockholder-dominated firms 
show how they put weight on both measures of performance providing support for my view 
of the importance of monitoring in determining the relative weights put on the measures of 
performance. It also serves to show once again that the differences between family and non-
family firms are not due to the ownership concentration, but rather are due to the family 
firms’ characteristics and familial relations. Finally, I show that family firms decide to replace 
a family CEO with a professional manager just when they need professional assistance (i.e. in 
cases of bad accounting performance). Instead, family firms replace a professional CEO with 
a family member in cases of low stock market returns, hence when the family feels threatened 
by potential takeovers and decide to appoint a family member in order to prevent any 
corporate raiders. 
Thirdly, Chapter 3 builds on what demonstrated in Chapter 2, and examines the 
understudied topic of CEO turnover and earnings management in family-controlled firms. 
Given the prominent role of the agency problem (i.e. managers extracting private rents at a 
cost to shareholders) in driving earnings management the firm’s corporate governance system 
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must be structured to minimize the incentives of mangers to engage in earnings management. 
As a result, I focus on one of the most extreme mechanisms boards have to discipline 
managers: CEO dismissal. In this regard, I provide evidence as to two distinct corporate 
governance systems: the one found in widely held firms, where the opportunistic behavior of 
extreme earnings management is punished with the CEO dismissal, and the one found in 
family-controlled firms, where the behavior is not punished. This chapter provides further 
evidence as to the differences in corporate governance mechanism and the care with which 
current results grounded in widely held firms should be applied to cases of family firms. 
Furthermore, it shows that in family-owned firms, the corporate governance’s mechanism aim 
at preventing opportunistic behavior such as extreme earnings management does not work, 
underlining collusion between managers and the dominant family.  
In conclusion, this dissertation shows that the corporate governance of family-owned 
firms significantly differs from that of non-family firms. Family firms’ characteristics, such as 
the collusion between the family and managers, the socioemotional wealth, and the 
idiosyncratic benefits of control, moderate results found in the previous studies for widely 
held (non-family) public corporations. Although family-owned firms report higher financial 
performance for the years here analyzed as compared to non-family firms, they present 
weaker corporate governance, hiding entrenchment and collusion between the dominant 
family and the management of the firm. 
The need for stronger corporate governance in family-owned firms is clear, and the 
findings of this dissertation are in line with what also claimed in some previous studies: 
“Family firms need to empower minority shareholders by effecting financial disclosure and 
auditing, along with strict internal rules to prevent self-dealing and transactions with family-
related businesses” (Lev, 2012). 
